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This thesis examines the tension between cooperation and conflict in inter-
American relations. Using the case study method, this thesis focuses on the level 
of integration between Venezuela and Colombia from 1983 through mid-1994. An 
extensive survey of historical materials and current press reports, the thesis assesses 
the vulnerabilities and sensibilities existing in the complex interdependence between 
the two countries and their perspectives for cooperation in the future. The thesis 
concludes that the prospects for cooperation are enhanced by: (1) the growing 
complexity of interdependence between Venezuela and Colombia; (2) economic 
integration between the two countries; and (3) continued democracy in each 
country. However, the inability to resolve the border security issues between 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Global international relations have become more complex since the end of the 
Cold War. As the international system moves toward multipolarity, the steadily growing 
interaction of economic, political, social and military arenas has produced a web of 
complex interdependence. In Latin America, the trend seems to be one where the 
movement toward integration is virtually irreversible. 
In order to understand the bilateral relation between Colombia and Venezuela, it 
is necessary to understand how the prospects for conflict and cooperation can be affected 
by the nature of their border security issues. Based on the theory of Keohane and Nye, 
this thesis argues that Venezuela and Colombia are involved in a complex interdependent 
relationship with a variety of linkages between the two countries: economic, diplomatic, 
immigration,and border security. 
The level of interdependence has become more complex as the two countries have 
drawn closer together through economic integration. The economic integration programs 
initiated by Venezuela and Colombia are important steps in the search for harmony and 
cooperation in their bilateral relationship. However, the tension in both countries 
generated by conflicts in border security issues (the maritime dispute over the Gulf of 
Venezuela, illegal immigration, cross-border insurgency, and drug-trafficking) can affect 
the level of their economic integration. 
This thesis examines the tension between cooperation and conflict in the 
Colombian-Venezuelan relationship from 1983 through mid-1994 and the security 
implications for the rest of the hemisphere. The research is based in the following 
hypothesis: the success of integration efforts between Colombia and Venezuela is directly 
linked to border security concerns, hence the inability to resolve the security issues will 
diminish the potential for successful economic integration. Nevertheless, the very process 
of integration between Colombia and Venezuela accentuates the complexity of the 
interdependence between the two countries by strengthening the current channels or 
forging new ones to resolve developing or protracted issues. As a result, as the theory 
of Keohane and Nye suggests, the greater the complexity in an interdependent 
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relationship, the less likely either country will resort to force or self-help to further its 
goals. One can conclude that it is highly unlikely that either Venezuela or Colombia will 
resort to force to settle their differences. However, although growing integration has 
made the utilization of force between the two countries less likely, both countries remain 
vulnerable and sensitive on numerous issues. The growth of interdependence does not 
remove issues from the bilateral agenda but accentuates them. 
Using the case study method, each one of the border security issues listed above 
was analyzed using an extensive survey of historical materials and current press reports 
which permitted to assessment of vulnerabilities and sensibilities existing in the complex 
interdependence between Venezuela and Colombia and their perspectives for cooperation 
in the future. Overall indications are that both countries desire increased cooperation. 
One of the greatest strengths of both Venezuela and Colombia lies in the fact that 
they are democratically ruled. The existence of a democratic system fosters greater levels 
of cooperation and promotes an environment that may result even the resolution of the 
maritime dispute, as well as the diverse border issues, through friendly and tolerant 
bilateral negotiations. There is ample evidence to show that democracies are the least 
violence-prone form of government. What is important to point out here is the 
relationship between democracy and stability. Democratic systems normally maximize 
and guarantee individual freedoms, promote pluralism and diversity, emphasize tolerance, 
and subscribe to the rule of law. However, where authoritarianism is the rule, there is a 
greater propensity and more fertile grounds for the emergence of violence. 
The thesis argues in conclusion that it is imperative for Venezuela and Colombia 
to: establish an effective agenda for identifying the hierarchy of their mutual security 
interests; make effective bilateral decisions that will diminish the vulnerabilities and 
sensitivities existing in the two countries; and, to initiate further confidence building 
measures. Relaying on the democratic systems existing in Colombia and Venezuela, the 
prospects for ongoing economic integration and cooperation appear to be good, and 
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although conflict will not entirely disappear, it can be managed through diplomacy and 
mutual respect. 
The implications for the western hemisphere are also good. The new wave of 
integration, free trade, the spread of democracy and complex interdependence could bring 
a new era of peace, mutual trust and cooperation in Inter-American relations. 
Xl 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until recently, international affairs were characterized by a Cold War, superpower 
dominance, and bipolarity that tended to globalize and militarize all issues. In the Third 
World, small wars and instability were common. As the international system has moved 
toward multipolarity, the reduced risk of East-West conflict has given greater prominence 
to economic vulnerability, political oppression, terrorism, drugs, and illegal immigration 
as security issues. A steadily growing interaction of an economic, political, social, and 
military nature has produced a web of complex interdependence. That interdependence 
has exposed vulnerabilities as well as mutual responsiveness, including the desire to work 
out problems cooperatively. 
In Latin America, the trend seems to be one where the movement towards 
integration is a stronger force than fragmentation. With the end of the Cold War, what 
constitutes a security threat is in the process of being redefined. Communism, now 
discredited, no longer constitutes a main threat. Instead, drug trafficking, illegal 
immigration, and regional instability (especially in the Caribbean, i.e., Venezuela and 
Colombia) are coming to constitute some of the new security threats emanating from the 
South. 
The main aim of this thesis is to examine the bilateral relations between Venezuela 
and Colombia by focusing on the tension between cooperation and conflict. The thesis 
topic is important because the manner in which Venezuela and Colombia deal with their 
bilateral security issues will have implications for regional integration and stability. The 
research is oriented by the following hypothesis: the success of border cooperation efforts 
is directly linked to border security concerns, hence the inability to resolve the security 
issues will diminish the potential for successful economic integration. This thesis makes 
use of the case study method and focuses on the level of integration between Venezuela 
and Colombia from 1983 through mid-1994. 
In Chapter I, this thesis provides an historical perspective of relations between 
Venezuela and Colombia, beginning with the dissolution of Gran Colombia in 1830. 
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Chapter II briefly sketches current relations between Venezuela and Colombia with a 
focus on the following issues: (1) the maritime dispute over the Gulf of Venezuela; (2) 
illegal immigration; (3) cross-border insurgency; and (4) drug trafficking. The case study 
will measure the potential impact of the aforementioned issues on policymaking of the 
two nations and the recent trend towards greater economic integration. The stage is set 
for Chapter III to focus on the security implications for the United States. Although there 
is an argument that with the end of the Cold War the United States will no longer care 
about Latin America, geography will make it difficult for the United States to ignore the 
region. Connected by land, it is inevitable that the problems of the region will continue 
to affect U.S. security. The thesis ends with some recommendations as to how the two 
countries can better manage border security policies in the future, in order to promote 
both political and economic cooperation between the two nations. 
A. THEORETICAL APPROACH OF THE THESIS 
In order to understand the bilateral relation between Colombia and Venezuela, one 
must take into consideration the development of inter-state relations in the international 
environment. Following World War II there emerged a variety of new approaches to the 
study of international relations. One of the approaches was based on the understanding, 
or observations that individual states possess vital interests and national objectives that are 
not necessarily always in harmony with the interests and objectives of other states. 1 
Scholars also consider the importance and effects of ideological forces, such as radical, 
irrational, and emotional factors in the formulation of domestic and foreign policies. 
In the process of studying the interactions between states, researchers have tried 
to establish a systematic grouping of findings, derived from empirical investigations, in 
an attempt to develop a set of general principles governing political behavior. Results 
have so far failed to yield a predictive model on interstate behavior based on a given set 
1 Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., Nations in a Multipolar World, Harper & Row Publishers, 
New York, 1968, p. 623. 
2 
of circumstances at any given point in time. The development of such a model would 
prove invaluable as an aid to maximizing state interaction. 
In the absence of such a model, a "theoretical scheme," or what is also known as 
an "analytical model," could be constructed to classify the various categories of states in 
the international arena, the different situations confronting these states, as well as the 
traditional responses manifested under these circumstances. 
The disintegration of the bipolar system and the new possibilities that have 
presented themselves with the end of the Cold War have had important implications on 
the conduct of international relationships. One of the most serious implications or 
aftereffects has been the phenomenon of "limited violence" among the members of the 
international community.2 The end of the Cold War, which brought to an end East-West 
confrontations along ideological lines, has left the states and the international system 
facing a series of destabilization factors such as violent political upheavals, border 
disputes, foreign sponsored insurrections, armed interventions, illegal immigration, racial 
and ethnic conflicts and drug trafficking. 
The resolution of these conflicts in the international environment is a complicated 
process, especially in those cases where there is a lack of appropriate channels to resolve 
these issues (as well as a lack of options). Often, these channels involve governmental 
agencies and institutions that are not completely effective. Likewise, the limitations 
imposed on international organizations further hinder the resolution of conflicts, making 
the process that much more complicated. However, despite all that has been said, existing 
conflicts between states in the Post-Cold War world are not necessarily impossible to 
solve. This is due in part to the fact that the political behavior governing the relationship 
between two States can vary. The ideal situation would be that the policies and 
capabilities developed to resolve conflicts be based on a mutual search for harmony and 
cooperation and on the use of rational, not violent or irrational methods. 
2 Ibid., p. 643. 
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This approach is of particular interest especially in those situations characterized 
by interdependence. In the case of Venezuela and Colombia, interdependence applies to 
a variety of situations characterized by reciprocal effects, some mutually beneficial, others 
not. The nature of the transaction, its intrinsic value and attendant costs, dictate the 
policy to be pursued and whether the costs exceed the benefits. 
According to Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, the role of power in an 
interdependent relationship is a function of two variables: sensitivity and vulnerability.3 
In their book, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, they defme 
sensitivity as "liability to costly effects imposed from outside before policies are altered 
to try to change the situation" and vulnerability as "an actor's liability to suffer costs 
imposed by external events even after policies have been altered. "4 
Sensitivity and vulnerability can encompass social, political or economic issues. 
However, of the two, vulnerability has the greatest strategic value and hence may be more 
relevant in determining outcomes. The degree of vulnerability shared by Venezuela and 
Colombia can be estimated by the effectiveness of the policies implemented by both 
nations designed to address border-related problems. In contrast, sensitive 
interdependence is the result of mostly unilateral actions taken independently by both 
countries before the affected actor has been able to adjust its policies. 
The dynamics of interdependence between Venezuela and Colombia is complicated 
by the clear lack in hierarchy among multiple security issues. 5 The politicization of 
security issues tends to confuse the agenda and adds to the controversy surrounding these 
issues. The ambiguity in the identification of national interests in both countries raises 
serious problems for the top governmental leaders. The identification of national interests 
can vary according to the circumstances. The process of economic integration initiated 
3 Robert Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics 
in Transition, Little, Brown and Company, Inc., 1977, p. 9. 
4 Ibid., p. 13. 
5 Ibid., p. 26. 
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recently between Colombia and Venezuela could be adversely affected by existing 
vulnerabilities and sensibilities concerning associated border security issues. 
The case studies and historical background provided on each of the prevailing 
border security issues should prove helpful in achieving an understanding of the political 
behavior between two states as they attempt to harmonize relations and seek greater 
cooperation. 6 
This process of harmonization and increased interdependence presents a series of 
implications for U.S. security. The nature of these implications and the manner in which 
a progression towards greater interdependence between Colombia and Venezuela can 
affect U.S. interests and national security are amplified upon later in this study. 
B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Strains between Venezuela and Colombia go back to colonial days and the sense 
of rivalry between "Santa Fe de Bogota" and "Santiago de Leon de Caracas" (the original 
names of the capitals of Colombia and Venezuela respectively). Despite sharing some 
common elements in terms of historical and cultural background, Colombia and Venezuela 
have diverged in their socioeconomic development. During the early part of the 
colonization period, unlike Colombia, Venezuela remained of marginal significance due 
to its lack of extractive resources such as gold and silver. Initial development of the area 
during the colonization period was hindered by the perceived lack of valuable resources, 
a dispersed native population, and the development of a deeply rooted resentment among 
the natives against their exploitation by Spanish slavers. As a result, Indian resistance 
throughout the region, lasted approximately a century. Cities and towns were initially 
limited to the coastal regions with very little effort made to extensively colonize the 
interior. Venezuela developed an agricultural based economy gaining a measure of 
prosperity through the production of cocoa and later coffee, which would dominate as an 
6 Joseph Frankel, International Politics: Conflict and Harmony, Allen Lane, The 
Penguin Press, 1969, p. 43. 
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export commodity until its replacement by oil during the early part of the twentieth 
century. 
Regional power during the colonization period was centered at Santa Fe de Bogota. 
The discovery of gold and precious stones in Colombia provided a strong incentive to 
explore, colonize, and develop the coast as well the interior. The port city of Cartagena 
quickly became established as a major conduit for intercontinental trade, becoming one 
of three ports in the Spanish colonies (the other two ports were Veracruz, Mexico and 
Nombre de Dios, Panama) authorized to conduct such trade. The provinces comprising 
Venezuela were thus administratively and economically dependent upon and subordinate 
to a centralized regional government located elsewhere and at a great distance. 
Prior to 1777, the region currently comprising Venezuela consisted of a varying 
number of independently governed provinces under the administrative jurisdiction of 
neighboring colonies. In 1526, administrative jurisdiction of the provinces was awarded 
to the Audiencia de Santo Domingo. In 1550, control was transferred to the Audiencia 
de Santa Fe de Bogota which was subsequently upgraded in 1718 to the Viceroyalty of 
New Granada.7 At the time of its consolidation under the Viceroyalty of New Granada, 
Venezuela was made up of five provinces: Caracas, Cumana, Merida de Maracaibo, 
Barinas, and Guayana. 8 Political recognition of the region was delayed until 1777, when 
Caracas was designated as the seat of the Captaincy General of Venezuela with the power 
to exercise political-military authority. Judicial-administrative authority was extended in 
1786 when the region was redesignated as the Audiencia de Venezuela. 9 
During the colonial days economic and demographic growth, combined with a 
sense of local identity and resentment against trading restrictions and discriminatory 
practices designed to favor a select minority, gave rise through time to growing feelings 
7 Federal Research Division Library of Congress, Venezuela a Country Study, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1993, p. 6. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid., p. 8. 
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of nationalism. Venezuela's extensive coastline, proximity with non-Spanish colonies in 
the West Indies, and commercial contacts placed it in a position to absorb new intellectual 
influences, thus further increasing its disaffection with the colonial status quo. Discontent 
among merchants with the monopolistic trade charter granted to a Basque corporation 
known as the Real Compania Guipuzcoana de Caracas directly contributed to the first 
insurrectionary movement against Spanish control in 1749.10 The movement was quickly 
suppressed. However, Venezuela would, in 1810, become the first Spanish colony to 
declare its independence. The transition to full independence was protracted over a period 
of several years characterized by clashes between the revolutionary forces, under the 
leadership of Simon Bolivar and loyalists. Bolivar, the liberator ofVenezuela, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Panama became one of the leading symbols of the 
independence movement throughout Latin America. 11 
The fight for independence proved to be more costly for Venezuela than Colombia 
not only in terms of resources expended and destroyed but also in terms of human 
casualties. Venezuela sacrificed nearly one third of its population in the revolution 
struggle. In contrast, fighting in Colombia was less fierce and more localized. 
Additionally, the agricultural based economy of Venezuela was more vulnerable to war-
time devastation and disruption than Colombia's mining economy. 
In 1819, leaders from present-day Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama met in 
Angostura, Venezuela (Ciudad Bolivar) to discuss the political future of the region once 
full independence was achieved. 12 Consensus was reached to unite into a single Republic, 
Gran Colombia, with its capital in Santa Fe de Bogota. Simon Bolivar was elected 
President and Francisco de Paula Santander, a Colombian, was named Vice-president. A 
constitution drafted in 1821, at the Congress of Cucuta (Colombia), provided the 
10 Ibid., p. 8. 
11 Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, editors, Democracy in 
Developing Countries: Latin America, Boulder, CO, 1989, p. 295. 
12 Emil Ludwig, Bolivar, Alliance Book Corporation, New York, 1946, p. 163. 
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framework for a highly centralized government based on popular representation with a 
bicameral Congress, a President, and a Supreme Court consisting of five magistrates. 
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However, Venezuelan nationalism in the person of General Paez and centered politically 
in Caracas, combined with a strong resentment against the rule by a government with a 
center in Colombia, a former sister colony; perceived grievances and feelings of political 
inequality influenced Venezuela to seek separation from Gran Colombia in 1829. 
Whether justified or not, Venezuela believed that Colombia was deriving greater benefits, 
at her expense, from the political union between the two countries. Santander, now 
President after Bolivar's resignation, was accused of ignoring Venezuelans in designating 
his major political appointments. Although it is true that Venezuelans were somewhat 
excluded from filling major political posts, they did monopolize the top military 
commands as a legacy of their wartime participation during the struggle for independence. 
In the end, the break between Colombia and Venezuela was welcomed by both sides, and 
was accepted with only some minor skirmishes. 
The breakup of Gran Colombia was precipitated by regional jealousies and mutual 
distrust between both countries. These are feelings which in one form or another have 
persisted over time and have influenced the way each country perceives the other and its 
people. For example, it is not uncommon for Colombians to perceive Venezuelans as 
aggressive, loud and hot-tempered based on a predominately African and Caribbean 
ancestry. Venezuelans, on the other hand, tend to perceive Colombians as cold, snobbish, 
and calculating with a tendency to put on airs as being more intellectual, based on their 
Andean and Spanish ancestry. 14 Commenting on the differences between these two 
13 Federal Research Division Library of Congress, Colombia: A Country Study, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1990, p. 20. 
14 Jack Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among 
Neighbors, Preager, New York, 1985, p. 153. 
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peoples, Simon Bolivar is reputed to have said that Venezuela was a barracks and 
Colombia was a law court. 15 
The boundary between Venezuela and Colombia was originally based on the 
existing boundary in 1810, which was not clearly defined. Under an 1842 boundary 
agreement known as the Pombo-Michelena Treaty, Venezuela had ceded its claim to the 
Guajira Peninsula to Colombia. 16 In 1881, both countries appealed to King Alfonso XII 
of Spain to arbitrate ongoing territorial disputes. 17 The resulting arbitration decision was 
rejected by Venezuela because of disagreement over the location of the source of the Rio 
Oro. Under a treaty signed in Bogota on April 24, 1894, but not ratified, Colombia ceded 
back to Venezuela certain territories, including a portion of the east coast of the Guajira 
Peninsula which had in 1891 been awarded to Colombia under arbitration. The border 
was not properly determined until 1932, in response to an arbitration award made on 
March 24, 1922, by the Swiss Federal Council, to which both countries had submitted 
their border disputes for arbitration. 18 Despite the border settlement, the countries 
continued to argue over their respective sovereignty claims to the Gulf of Venezuela and 
the area surrounding the Los Monjes Islands to the northeast of the Guajira Peninsula 
(Fig. 1 ). The areas in question are critical in controlling access to Lake Maracaibo in 
Venezuela and its underlying oil deposits as well as rights over any existing deposits 
which may extend into the Gulf of Venezuela. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Federal Research Division Library of the Congress, Colombia: A Country 
Study, U.S . Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1990, p. 273. 
17 Venezuela: A Country Study, p. 188. 
18 Border and Territorial Disputes, Gale Research Co, Michigan, 1982, p. 414. 
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Figure 1. Location of the Los Monjes Islands to the northeast of the Guajira 
Peninsula (Gulf of Venezuela). 
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II. THE BORDER SECURITY ISSUES 
A. THE MARITIME DISPUTE OVER THE GULF OF VENEZUELA 
1. General Overview 
As is the case of many South American territorial disputes, the problem stems 
from the imprecise definition of the frontiers under Spanish rule. The Guajira Peninsula 
was not very attractive to the Spaniards because it lacked mineral resources and people, 
and development was very low. However, the demarcation of maritime borders between 
Venezuela and Colombia have gone through changes in response to border demarcations 
in the Guajira Peninsula. When the border with Colombia was established at Cabo de la 
Vela in 181 0, Venezuela had a territorial sea limits of three nautical miles. If Venezuela 
had retained the original border at Cabo de La Vela, its corresponding territorial waters 
would have expanded from three nautical miles to twelve nautical miles in accordance 
with the later developing Law of the Sea. However, in respect to the Pombo-Michelena 
Treaty in 1842, the reduction of the western border from Cabo de La Vela to Cabo 
Chichibacoa, resulted in the loss of the corresponding littoral area and eventually also 
included a loss of: maritime jurisdictional rights of over 40,000 square kilometers of 
territorial waters, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf 
(which makes up most of the loss in maritime jurisdiction). (Fig. 2). 
Afterwards, the Spanish Treaty of 1891 (known as the Laudo Espanol), further 
reduced the western border from Cabo Chichibacoa to Castilletes. The loss of land was 
exacerbated by the additional loss of territorial waters through an unfortunate 
interpretation over the "mogotes" (archipelagos) Los Monjes; which further extended the 
loss of maritime and submarine areas, including the loss of some rights over the mouth 
of the Gulf of Venezuela (which previously had been exclusively Venezuelan). ( Fig. 3). 
Later in 1922, arbitration by the Swiss Federal Council failed to solve the maritime 
dispute over the waters of the Gulf of Venezuela. In 1941, the Treaty on Border 













Figure 2. Reduction of the Venezuelan western border from Cabo de Ia Vela to Cabo 
Chichibacoa in the Guajira Peninsula (Pomo-Micelena Treaty of 1842). 
~RUBA 
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Figure 3. Reduction of the Venezuelan western border from Cabo Chichibacoa to Castilletes in 
the Guajira Peninsula (Spanish Treaty of 1891). 
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addressing among other issues the border demarcation along the Guajira Peninsula19 but 
did not address the extension of the maritime boundary into the Gulf of Venezuela. The 
Santos-Lopez Contreras Treaty was criticized extensively by Venezuelans who felt too 
much territory had been granted to Colombia. 
Although several treaties such as the Spanish Treaty of 1891, the Swiss Federal 
Council of 1922, and the Treaty of Border Demarcation and Navigation of Common 
Rivers were signed defining the ground border between Venezuela and Colombia, the 
extension of the maritime boundary into the Gulf of Venezuela was never clearly 
established. With the development of the Law of the Sea and its concepts, a new 
challenge emerged centered on the final resolution of the issues. 
Central to the dispute is the ownership of the Los Monjes Archipelago; possession 
of these islands provides the legal basis for extending the maritime frontier into the key 
mouth of the Maracaibo Basin and possible oil areas in the Gulf of Venezuela itself.20 
Since 1528, Los Monjes Archipelago have been under control of Venezuela beginning 
with the Provincia de Venezuela, the Captaincy General of Venezuela, the Department of 
Venezuela and finally the Republic of Venezuela. 21 Additionally, after several intents to 
annex the Archipelago to Colombia, in 1952 the Colombian Foreign Affairs Minister sent 
a diplomatic letter to the Venezuelan Ambassador in Bogota recognizing in "an 
indisputable way" the Venezuelan sovereignty over Los Monjes.22 The diplomatic letter 
also stated that because Colombia recognized Venezuelan sovereignty over the 
Archipelago it would not oppose nor challenge in any form the legal authority of 
19 Colombia: A Countrv Study, p. 273. 
2° Child, Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: quarrels among neighbors, p. 
154. 
21 
"Los limites entre Venezuela y Colombia: Documentos Oficiales que los han 
establecido," Ediciones de Ia Academia Nacional de Ia Historia, Caracas, Venezuela, 
1993, p. 526. 
22 Ibid. 
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Venezuela to exercise sovereignty over Los Monjes. The ramifications of this decision 
by Colombia can be considered as a critical mistake in the conduct of foreign affairs since 
it effectively and irrevocably granted Venezuela an important legal basis to defending its 
maritime and submarine rights over the Gulf of Venezuela. 
The relative political compatibility of both governments to settle this issue has 
played an important role in the various outcomes. When both countries shared a similar 
type of government at a given time, relations tended to improve. Conversely relationships 
tended to deteriorate if one was a democracy and the other a dictatorship. For example, 
the Los Monjes islands were militarily occupied by Venezuela under the dictatorship of 
General Marcos Perez Jimenez (1953-1958). This action was taken in response to 
Colombian arguments calling for the extension of the continental shelf off the Guajira 
Peninsula into the waters adjacent to the Gulf of Venezuela; and their observations that 
the Los Monjes do not posses their own territorial sea nor continental shelf. Based on this 
argument, the boundary proposed by Colombia would bisect the entrance to the Gulf of 
Venezuela at a point equidistant between the two countries. This would place the Los 
Monjes islands within Colombian territorial waters, allowing it to expand its national 
territory into the Caribbean based on a 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone around 
the islands.23 At stake also are the control and rights to estimated oil reserves of close to 
10 billion barrels in possible offshore deposits.24 
The position of Colombia in denying any territorial sea to Los Monjes is generated 
in response to the proximity of the islands to the Colombian mainland. The archipelago 
(or the closest island) is located only 19 miles from the Colombian coast. Therefore it 
is impossible for both countries, Colombia and Venezuela, to claim 12 miles of territorial 
sea within the area. Additionally, some Colombian jurists have argued that Los Monjes 
should be considered keys rather than islands because they are "crags" surrounded by sea 
which would not admit nor support any kind of human settlement. Venezuela refutes this 
23 Colombia: A Country Study, p. 273. 
24 Ibid. 
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concept, arguing that Los Monjes can not be considered keys because they are not coral 
formations. More importantly, during the high tides the islands are never covered. This 
is the main factor in considering Los Monjes islands with legal rights to a territorial sea 
and continental shelf. This has been the main obstacle in reaching a settlement. 
Colombia recognizes Venezuelan rights to territorial seas but is unwilling to recognize 
similar rights over the continental shelf.25 
2. The Dispute and Analysis of Concepts 
The maritime perspective stresses that the control of the oceans is the best way to 
project power. The oceans of the world traditionally have been classified under the 
following definitions: internal waters, territorial seas, and high seas. Each country has 
it own preference for maximizing the benefits derived from the Law of the Sea. 
However, in the case of Venezuela and Colombia their interests over the maritime dispute 
of the Gulf of Venezuela makes more difficult the application of different concepts stated 
in the Law of the Sea. 
The present section examines the application of concepts such as territorial sea, 
contiguous zone, continental shelf, and exclusive economic zone. Colombia and 
Venezuela have been trying to settle the issue for more than 30 years. Both nations differ 
with the application of concepts because any final decision over the dispute will have a 
very important impact on their national interests. 
a. Territorial Sea 
The territorial sea is a belt of ocean which is measured seaward from the 
baseline of the coastal or island nation and is subject to its sovereignty. At present it is 
internationally accepted as a distance of 12 nautical miles from the coast.26 
25 Los Limites entre Venezuela y Colombia: Documentos Oficiales que los han 
establecido, p. 526. 
26 The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, NNP q (Rev. A), 
FMFM 1-10, Washington, D.C., 1989, pp. 1-13. 
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If this concept is applied to the case of Colombia, the extension of its 
territorial seas by 12 nautical miles would place the Colombian boundary several miles 
from the center of the Gulf of Venezuela. Venezuela applies this concept by measuring 
12 nautical miles along the prolongation of the existing land border in Castilletes (Fig. 4). 
The different applications are based on the distinct approaches whereby the Colombians 
argue that the coastlines involved are opposite and the Venezuelans argue instead that they 
are not opposite but adjacent. Using the Venezuelan interpretation, a wide corridor would 
bisect the center of the Gulf. This corridor would in fact constitute a partial or complete 
area considered as a contiguous zone, where the individual states would exercise powers 
that differ from those exercised over the territorial seas. For Venezuela it is very 
important to preserve this corridor or navigation canal without any restriction from 
Colombia that could potentially impede or obstruct the necessary communication from 
Lake Maracaibo. This an issue of extreme importance to Venezuela. 
The location of Los Monjes in the northern part of the Gulf of Venezuela 
represents another problem further complicating the demarcation of both nation's 
territorial seas. Los Monjes are islands. Furthermore, they generate territorial sea, and 
as discussed previously, they are only 19 nautical miles from the Colombian coastline. 
When the concept of territorial sea is applied to this case, both nations find their territorial 
seas overlapping one another. In this case, given the situation that there are only 19 
nautical miles, each nation should technically enjoy only 9.5 nautical miles of territorial 
sea. 
b. Contiguous Zone 
A contiguous zone is defined as an area extending seaward from the 
territorial sea in which the coastal or island nation may exercise the control necessary to 
prevent or punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitary laws and 
regulations that occur within its territory or territorial sea. As is internationally accepted, 
the contiguous zone extends 12 nautical miles from the base-lines used to measure the 
16 
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Figure 4. Application of the concept of Territorial Sea by Venezuela (V) and by Colombia (C). 
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territorial sea. 27 
The application of a contiguous zone to a Colombian territorial sea 
boundary north of Castilletes would not impede Venezuelan access to the Gulf of 
Venezuela. Traditional superpowers and maritime-expansionist nations such as the United 
Kingdom in the past and the United States at present, have resisted any attempts by other 
nations to extend their territorial seas particularly in situations that could affect their 
navigation rights. For Venezuela it is vital to its national interests to keep its navigation 
rights over· the Gulf of Venezuela and ability to control the adjacent maritime areas off 
its coasts, hence Venezuela's ongoing concern with Colombian intentions in reference to 
the status of its territorial sea. 
c. Continental Shelves 
The juridical continental shelf of a coastal or island nation consists of the 
seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline 
used to measure the territorial sea where the continental margin does not extend that 
distance. The continental shelf may not extend beyond 350 nautical miles from the 
baseline of the territorial sea or 100 nautical miles from the 2,500 meter isobath, 
whichever is greater. Although the coastal or island nation exercises sovereign rights over 
the continental shelf for purposes of exploring and exploiting its natural resources, the 
legal status of the superjacent water is not affected. Moreover, all nations have the right 
to lay submarine cables and pipelines on the continental shelf.28 
Perhaps this is the one concept that has presented the greatest difficulty to 
reaching an agreement. Colombia claims the use of a half line as the only method and 
herein lies the fundamental difference between the two countries. The use of the half line 
is not the only method available but simply one among several other options that could 
be pursued in resolving this issue. The demarcation of the continental shelf between two 
27 Ibid., pp. 1-18. 
28 Ibid., pp. 1-23. 
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adjacent or opposite coastlines should be solved by mutual agreement and in conformity 
with the international law. Additionally, it is important to stress that the half line method 
will not result or lead to the principle of equity in the case of the Gulf, hence Venezuela's 
rejection of this method. For example, the precedent adjudicated by the International 
Court of Justice in reference to the dispute between Denmark and Holland against 
Germany concerning the demarcation of the continental shelf in the North Sea made it 
clear that the use of the half line method was not an exclusive procedure in resolving this 
type of dispute.29 This decision provides a legal reference for Venezuela's continued 
position against the use of the half line method. Additionally, the existence of Los 
Monjes islands in the area precludes the use of the half line method and constitutes 
another important factor in the continued rejection of this method (Fig. 5). The location 
of Los Monjes in close proximity to the Colombian coastline impedes the application of 
the concept of continental shelf between the Venezuelan islands and the Colombian 
mainland. The use of this concept in overlapping territorial seas would not make any 
sense (Fig. 6). However, the projection of Los Monjes territorial sea to the Caribbean 
should not be in any case disqualified. There are those that argue that Los Monjes should 
be Colombian territory because their proximity to Colombia's mainland. However, this 
alone is insufficient based on historical precedence as exemplified by Colombia's 
possession of the islands of San Andres (located about 120 nautical miles east of the 
Nicaraguan coast and 430 from the Colombian), Providencia (located about 150 nautical 
miles from Nicaragua and 460 nautical miles from Colombia) and other keys such as 
Quitasueno Bank, due north of Providencia; Roncador Key, due east of Providencia; and 
Serrana Bank, north of Roncador and east of Quitasueno (Fig. 7). In this case, Colombia 
is currently exercising both territorial sea and continental shelf against Nicaraguan claims. 
29 Ruben Carpio Castillo, "Geopolitica de Venezuela," Editorial Ariel-Seix Barral 





Figure 5. LMC = Half Line Method Proposed by Colombia. 
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Figure 6. This figure represents the proposed Territorial Sea (·---·-) and the proposed 
Continental Shelf(+++++++) by Colombia. 
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d. Exclusive Economic Zone 
Exclusive economic zones (EEZ'S) are the resource-related zones adjacent 
to the coast and extending beyond the territorial sea. The coastal or island nation may 
exercise jurisdiction in the zone over the establishment and use of artificial islands, 
installations, and structures having economic purposes; over marine scientific research 
(with reasonable limitations); and over some aspects of marine environmental protection 
(primarily implementation of international vessel-source pollution control standards).30 
In the Gulf of Venezuela, the exclusive economic zone (pending 
demarcation) with Colombia is small but still very important for Venezuela, given the 
special economic characteristics of the area. 
3. Recent Events 
In the mid 1960's, during Colombian President Lleras Restrepo's administration, 
it was alleged in Venezuela that Colombia had granted certain U.S. oil companies 
prospecting concessions in Venezuelan territory, specifically, in the Gulf of Venezuela. 
Caracas protested that the Gulf was an inland waterway whose waters were "traditionally 
and historically Venezuelan."31 Nevertheless, the two governments agreed to engage in 
talks on the delineation of marine and submarine areas. In 1968, the Venezuelan Foreign 
Affairs Minister defined his government's position on the subject as uncompromising and 
unwilling to concede any arguments in favor of Colombia's claim.32 
A series of unsuccessful negotiating attempts followed during the remainder of the 
1970's and 1980's. Talks continued until1980, when a tentative agreement was reached 
on a draft treaty (Hypothesis of Caraballeda) over the delineation of marine areas (Fig. 
8). The draft treaty allowed for the passage of all Venezuelan/Colombian merchant 
vessels and that of their warships and non-commercial state owned vessels. It reaffirmed 
30 Ibid., pp. 1-20. 
31 Border and Territorial Disputes, p. 415. 
32 Ibid. 
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Figure 7. Colomhia 's posess ion of the isl:mds of Snn Andres, Providcncia, and other Keys such 
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Figure 8. Hypothesis of Caraballeda in 1980. J\, B, C. D, E = Delineation of Territorial Sea 
proposed by Colombia. 
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Venezuela's possession ofLos Monjes Islands, recognized limited Colombian rights in the 
Gulf, and also provided for the joint development of oil fields extending across the 
boundary between the two countries. 33 Opposition to the treaty was widespread in 
Venezuela on nationalistic grounds and was also opposed (although to a much lesser 
degree) by some circles in Colombia. Due to a lack of consensus in both nations, the 
treaty was never ratified and further talks on the issue were suspended later that year. 
Afterwards, the Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice accepted a plea to nullify the 1941 
Santos-Lopez Contreras Treaty. This action was viewed with much concern by 
Colombians, who interpreted the action to mean that the Venezuelans were preparing to 
take a much tougher negotiating stance. Colombia's concerns continued to increase over 
Venezuela's aggressive posture favoring Argentina during the Falkland Island conflict, the 
demonstrated limited applicability of the Rio Treaty in deterring and resolving a potential 
crisis, the purchase of twenty four F-16 fighters from the U.S. in 1984-1985, and the 
increasing number of border incidents.34 Tensions between both countries continued to 
increase in regards to another important source of friction, illegal immigration of 
Colombians to Venezuela.35 The border between Colombia and Venezuela is 2,200 
kilometers in length. Most of it is either sparsely populated or heavily forested, 
particularly along the southwest portion. However, the border south of the Guajira 
Peninsula is one of the most populated in Latin America. In contrast to typical Latin 
American border zones, it is not an "empty" area where the frontier cuts through a region 
low in population density. This stretch of Colombian-Venezuelan border is populated by 
a rather homogeneous mestizo group that shares many ethnic traits and family ties with 
Colombians. 36 This makes it relatively easy for Colombians to be assimilated when they 
33 Venezuela a Country Study, p. 188. 




cross. There is a significant difference in the standard of living and per capita income (as 
well as much higher rate of unemployment) in Colombia. Additionally, smuggling 
activities along the porous border makes this area difficult to control. Specifically, the 
contemporary context of illegal activities have taken on an emphasis of drug and arms 
runnmg. 
The drugs cartels have developed an extraordinary technology (including the use 
of fiber glass mid-jet submarines) to ship drugs to vessels in the Caribbean sea and then 
to transport the merchandise to United States or to European markets.37 Maracaibo and 
other coastal provinces in Venezuela have changed with the cocaine traffic. There has 
been a boom in real estate prices despite a recession and residents have complained in the 
press about the presence of hired gunmen (equipped with landing strips and four-wheel 
drive vehicles) who work for large haciendas in Zulia. Venezuelans acknowledged that 
without radar to control its land and sea area their porous borders with Colombia make 
drug smuggling easy. 
Tensions finally peaked in mid-August 1987 with an incursion into Venezuelan 
waters at the mouth of the gulf by a Colombian corvette, the Caldas, in conjunction with 
overflights by Colombian Mirage fighters. The presence of the Colombian corvette was 
interpreted by Venezuelan authorities to be an attempt to assert Colombia's claims to 
sovereignty of the area. In reality it may have represented a symbolic gesture to bring 
international attention and pressure to bear upon Venezuela to resolve the dispute with a 
compromise. Venezuela responded immediately with a diplomatic protest. In addition, 
F -16 fighters and ground troops along the border were placed on alert pending the failure 
of a diplomatic resolution and withdrawal of the Colombian vessel. For a short time open 
hostilities appeared imminent. As a result there has been no resumption of formal talks 
on the delineation of maritime waters until recently, when former Venezuelan President 
Carlos Andres Perez stated "that Colombia had legal rights in about 10 percent of the Gulf 
37 
"Narcotraficantes emplean alta tecnologia," Diario El Espectador, Bogota, 
Colombia, (EFE), February, 1994. 
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of Venezuela." This announcement (along with the popular discontent caused by his 
austerity program) provoked a coup attempt in February, 1992, by a faction of the 
Venezuelan Army known as "the Bolivarianos," which among other things had rejected 
any territorial concession to Colombia. 
In December 1993 with talks on resolving the territorial difference on hold, at least 
until after the new Venezuelan President took office in February, 1994, exchanges 
between the two governments became noticeably irritating. The tension originated with 
an incident on November 1993, when four members of the Venezuelan National Guard 
were wounded in an ambush, apparently by Colombian guerrillas, near the Venezuelan 
border post of Cutufi in Tachira state. A week later five Venezuelan guardsmen were 
killed in another ambush in the remote Alto A pure region, bordering on Colombia's 
Arauca Department. These incidents provoked a protest note from the Venezuelan 
Foreign Minister, in which he reproached the Colombian government for doing nothing 
about these recurring "aggressions planned in Colombian territory."38 Later, in 1994 
President Caldera mentioned the renewal of talks on the sea boundary dispute but despite 
Caldera's apparent commitment to seeking solution, no consensus or basis for 
understanding was reached during the first six months of bilateral negotiations between 
the two countries. 
B. ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 
1. General Overview 
The illegal immigration of Colombians to Venezuela constitutes a serious source 
of friction in bilateral relationships between the two nations. This is true especially for 
Venezuela as the receiving country must shoulder the economic burden derived from this 
social phenomenon. 
38 "Government sends Communique to Colombia on Border Attacks," Daily 
Report: Latin America, FBIS-LAT-223, Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 
Washington, D.C., December 4, 1993, p. 54. 
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The economic costs for Venezuela include: resources for satisfying the immigrants 
basic necessities, the displacement of native workers, the increase in indexes of national 
unemployment, the additional burden on public and social services, and the mounting 
costs incurred with the increase in crime. 
The precise number of illegal immigrants in Venezuela is unknown. However, it 
is estimated that the number varies between 500,000 and 3,000,000 with more than 70 
percent of the illegal immigrants originating in Colombia.39 Many of the illegal aliens 
enter Venezuela via the infamous "green roads," others have used bribes offered to border 
officials in exchange for entrance and/or false documentation, and still others initially 
enter as tourists and never legalize their status, but continue to live and work with tourists 
cards, usually gaining employment in low paying jobs.40 In Venezuela, this situation is 
complicated by legislation which allows foreign women (who give birth to children while 
residing in Venezuela) to remain indefinitely in the country. The large flow of 
Colombian workers to Venezuela may be considered to be an important phenomenon of 
the twentieth century in terms of its socioeconomic impact. During the most recent years, 
the massive immigration of Colombian workers has been characterized by consisting 
primarily of "illegals," starting from 1970.41 Colombia became the supplier of workers 
to Venezuela during this period of quick economical development. However, this 
migration was uncontrolled and without legal procedures. 
2. The Origin and Nature of the Problem 
Venezuela experienced an economic boom during the 1970's as a result of rising 
oil prices. This in turn prompted an urban migration as people from rural areas moved 
into the cities in search of higher wages. This in turn created a vacuum in the agricultural 
39 Venezuela a Country Study, p. 55. 
40 Los de Afuera: Un Estudio Analitico del Proceso Migratorio en Venezuela, 
CEPAM, Caracas, Venezuela, 1985, p. 75. 
41 Crisis y Fronteras: Relaciones Fronterizas Binacionales de Colombia con 
Venezuela y Ecuador, Fondo Editorial CEREC, 1989, p. 139. 
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sector which was filled primarily by Colombian migrants. It is also important to note the 
impact of political instability throughout the region on immigration. In Latin America the 
1970's were characterized by a series of repressive dictatorships. (i.e., Chile, Argentina 
and Peru). Political violence was common in countries such as Colombia42 and Uruguay 
for different reasons as well as in other Latin American countries. Many of the politically 
and economically displaced equated Venezuela with the famous legend of El Dorado,43 
a land of gold. Many of the immigrants who have come to Venezuela have done so in 
search of a better life and in some cases to flee political persecution. 
Venezuela per capita income has been one of the highest throughout Latin 
America.44 In 1988, per capita income was equal to U.S. $3,250. By 1991, in response 
to lower oil prices, it had declined to U.S. $2,730. However, despite this decrease it is 
still one of the highest in the region and thus an inducement for continued economic 
migration from less developed countries.45 Additionally, since 1958, Venezuela's relative 
political stability and democratic government have also served as an additional inducement 
for immigration. 
The large and sudden influx of immigrants resulted in a commensurate growth in 
the rates of: poverty, unemployment, crime, and also resulted in a degree of general 
social deterioration. This "natural invasion" was directed mainly at the large cities where, 
based on hopes and expectations, most immigrants looked forward to a better way of life. 
However, those hopes were dashed when faced with the harsh reality of living in poverty 
(often under unsanitary and unhealthy conditions) and in newly formed shanty towns 
42 "Sin Politica Migratoria Seguin! la Problematica de los Indocumentados," El 
Nacional, Caracas, Venezuela, March 7, 1987. 
43 Venezuela a Country Study, p. 7. 
44 Almanague Mundial 1992, Editorial America, S.A., U.S.A., 1991, p. 295. 
45 World Development Report 1993: Investing in Health, Oxford University Press, 
New York, 1993, p. 238. 
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(barrios) in the periphery of major urban centers such as Caracas, Maracaibo, Valencia, 
etc. 
The frontier region between Venezuela and Colombia is one of the most populated 
and trafficked in Latin America.46 In the state of Tachira (Venezuela), an average of 
more than 120,000 people and 10,000 vehicles cross the border on any given day. The 
boundary between Venezuela and Colombia is difficult and nearly impossible to monitor. 
This has contributed to the high incidence of drug trafficking, often smuggled in vehicles 
or on individuals. 
Drugs are also brought in by air and dropped into Venezuelan territory. Due to 
the large influx of immigrants, there are several regions along the border where the 
immigrant population has come to outnumber the local Venezuelan population. For 
example, in 1981 it was estimated that between Casigua and the Venezuelan Guajira 
(Zulia), for each 24,000 Venezuelans there were 140,000 Colombian illegal aliens. The 
analysis of the social, political, and economical conditions (in both Colombia and 
Venezuela) could easily provide a simple answer to the unidirectional migratory flow 
(west -east). 
Beginning in the early 1980's, the economic crisis suffered in Venezuela resulted 
in the growth of a xenophobic feeling often directed at illegal aliens. By this time the 
influx of illegal aliens had assumed alarming proportions and increasingly was considered 
by the Venezuelan government as a factor affecting national security and social stability. 
Control of the border falls under the jurisdiction of the National Guard. The 
National Guard is not only responsible for illegal immigration and drug trafficking but 
also for smuggling activities and confronting guerrilla attacks. The practice of smuggling 
in the Colombian-Venezuelan border involves the transport of gasoline and foods. In 
Maracaibo (Zulia), the Venezuelan National Guard has captured large amounts of gasoline 
46 Child, Jack, Geopolitics and Conflict m South America: Quarrels Among 
Neighbors, p. 154. 
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being smuggled in trucks across the border into Colombia.47 Despite continued success, 
fuel smuggling continues to be a growing problem. 
Additionally, the food smuggling problem ts graver still. Small, isolated 
Colombian towns (i.e., Cucuta and Maicao) survive only by smuggling and extracting 
foods from Venezuelan frontier towns (i.e., San Antonio de el Tachira). The current 
Venezuelan economic crisis and the abrupt devaluation of the bolivar (Venezuelan national 
currency) are partly responsible for the consolidation of the Colombian peso. 
Colombians travel in mass to buy foods and goods in Venezuelan border towns.48 In 
respect to this phenomenon, the Venezuelan National Guard generally responds with acts 
of repression, the merchants increase prices, and (in spite of the higher prices) there are 
not enough goods available and the merchandise is frequently not resupplied. As a result, 
the region has developed many problems. The amount of food that is illegally shipped 
to the other side of the Venezuelan border is not exactly known, but, it is estimated that 
there are thousands of tons smuggled on a daily basis. During the month of June 1994, 
when President Caldera (Venezuela) decreed the control of currency exchange and 
suspended economical constitutional guarantees (due to the strong economical crisis), the 
commerce of illegally smuggling food towards Colombia proliferated.49 In border towns 
like Paraguaipoa (Venezuela) a great mobilization of food towards Colombia was 
observed every weekend. Substantial amounts of provisions (i.e., oil foodstuff, sanitary 
paper, milk, rice, and various other products of primary necessity) were shipped by 
smuggling means toward Colombia and placed for sale in the main streets of Colombian 
border towns (i.e., Maicao and Cucuta). 
47 
"Contrabando de Gasolina en la Frontera," El Nacional, Caracas, Venezuela, July 
13, 1994. 
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"Desabastecimiento en la Frontera por el Contrabando de Extracci6n," El 
Nacional, Caracas, Venezuela, May 22, 1994. 
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Of course, this environment of illegal activity along the border region between the 
two nations stimulates the illegal exodus of Colombian immigrants toward Venezuela. 
The ex-Minister of Foreign Affairs from Colombia, Mrs. Noemi Sanin de Rubio recently 
admitted that the number of illegal Colombians in Venezuela is approximately 700,000. 50 
However, in 1981 the Ambassador from Colombia, Mr. Cornelio Reyes, calculated the 
number of illegals to be around two million. 51 Even so, if the number of Colombians 
legally residing in Venezuela is added in, the figure could be much higher in both counts. 
In 1987, during the Gulf of Venezuela crisis, when the Colombian corvette 
"Caldas" penetrated Venezuelan territorial waters, the Colombians residing in Venezuela 
submitted a letter of protest to the Colombian President, Mr. Virgilio Barco.52 That letter 
was subscribed to by more than 12,000 signatures and declared "consider it fully that 
there are more than three million (3,000,000) Colombians living in this generous country 
and your anti-Bolivarian attitude places us in a very uncomfortable situation." 
The Venezuelan Institute of Frontier Studies, has also reported on (with great 
concern) the enormous mass of Colombians, in one form or another, that reside in 
Venezuela. This Institute, after conducting several analysis concerning the immigration 
issue has arrived at the conclusion that after former Venezuelan President Carlos Andres 
Perez implanted the politics of open doors (by earth, by sea, or by air) with Colombia, 
the Colombian population in Venezuela could easily pass the figure of five million 
(5,000,000).53 
In order to have an idea of what this means to Venezuela, it is necessary to remark 
that this alarming amount of immigrants easily surpasses the total population of Denmark, 
50 
" Hacia un Estado Colombiano en Venezuela," El Globo, Caracas, Venezuela, 
November 1, 1993. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Reporte Especial del Institute de Estudios Fronterizos, Caracas, Venezuela, 
1993. 
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overcomes the population of Norway and Finland, and is equivalent to the population of 
both Panama and Costa Rica. For this reason, in Venezuela it is considered that the mass 
of Colombians residing in the country could constitute "a Colombian state in Venezuelan 
territory. "54 
The concept of "a Colombian state in Venezuelan territory" is also reinforced by 
the legal frame that establishes the new Political Constitution of the Republic of Colombia 
of 1991.55 New constitutional dispositions in Colombia establish the following points: 
(1) the children (if born in a foreign country) are considered Colombians by birth if the 
father and mother are both Colombian citizens; (2) No Colombian by birth will be 
deprived of his nationality. The qualification as a national Colombian is not lost by the 
fact of acquiring another nationality; and (3) A Colombian, although having given up the 
status as a Colombian national, will be judged a traitor if that act is against the national 
interests of Colombia, in an external war. 
Additionally, it is necessary to add to this the negative effect of Presidential 
Decree #1911, of October 24, 1991, signed by former President Perez, which ordered the 
maternities and Venezuelan authorities to accept the birth of children of illegal aliens as 
Venezuelan citizens with the only requirement being the presentation of two witnesses. 56 
However, it maintained the requirement of a series of diverse and complicated steps for 
citizenship for the children of legitimate Venezuelans. 
The effects of Presidential Decree # 1911 were so alarming for Venezuela that it 
obligated the Republic General Attorney, Dr. Ramon Escovar Salom, to solicit its 
consideration for rejection by President Velasquez in 1993. Previously, in March of 1992, 
Dr. Escovar Salom had solicited the Venezuelan Supreme Court of Justice to nullify 
54 
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Presidential Decree # 1911. An example of the undesirable effects is seen in a social study 
conducted in the frontier state of Tachira. The study showed that of a total of 2,188 
births that occurred between October 24, 1991, and March 31, 1992, 385 (or 18 percent) 
corresponded to solicitations for citizenship executed by undocumented Colombian 
parents. 57 The execution of Presidential Decree #1911 constituted a true social problem 
that created belts of penury and illegal migration of Colombian delinquents. The addition 
of these two factors added another serious obstacle for the security and development of 
Venezuela. The actions taken by Republic General Attorney Dr. Escovar Salom against 
Presidential Decree # 1911 created ill feelings in Colombia and made him appear to be a 
notorious enemy of that country. 
In reality, the Venezuelan General Attorney had sufficient juridical foundation 
against Decree # 1911 based on the following arguments: ( 1) it is a right of Venezuelan 
national sovereignty to decide on who constitutes its nationals; (2) Decree # 1911 is against 
the Venezuelan National Constitution, the Civil Code, and the Law of Foreigners; (3) the 
decree offers special privileges (concerning Venezuelan law) to illegal aliens not available 
to Venezuelan citizens; (4) the decree was not in accordance with the law consecrated in 
the Venezuelan National Constitution concerning children and knowledge of their parents; 
(5) it favors the traffic of minors (in age); and (6) it stimulated the growth of illegal 
immigration to Venezuela. 58 
The Colombian answer to the nullification of Presidential Decree # 1911, ordered 
by President Velasquez (Venezuela), did not take long in appearing. Several 
representatives of the Colombian government and members of its diplomatic body 
expressed their rejection of the decision and new position taken by the Venezuelan 
government. Mr. Jose Dagond, the Consul from Colombia in Venezuela, tried to defend 
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Presidential Decree #1911 by manifesting that Venezuela had violated the universal and 
fundamental laws of children. 59 
3. Recent Events 
The situation of uncertainty m the frontier region between Venezuela and 
Colombia tended to worsen in response to persistent complaints about human rights abuses 
and violations against Colombian nationals deported from Venezuela. 60 
Every year, an unknown but increasing number of Colombian citizens are deported 
upon detection in having entered Venezuela in an illegal manner. Like any citizen, the 
deported person has laws and rights that should be respected by the country that is 
expelling them from its territory. This is precisely the most sensitive point made by the 
Colombian government during the most recent treatment of this topic with Venezuela. 
In 1991, an official number of 1,700 Colombians were deported from Venezuela.61 In 
1992, this figure increased to approximately 2,800.62 The Colombian government has 
expressed its concern and has asked the government of Venezuela to carry out the process 
in a more rapid manner and in accordance with the agreements established in international 
conventions. Concurrently, Venezuela has also expressed an interest in concluding a 
treaty for the repatriation of Colombian prisoners detained in Venezuelan jails. 
Since the 1970's, Venezuela has experienced an ever increasing amount m 
relatively violent crimes in border and urban areas. In the border areas the criminal 
offenses consist of trafficking in drugs, illegal immigration, and kidnappings. In the 
urban areas the crimes committed include: homicides, robberies of banks, and theft of 
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vehicles (which generally are transported to the other side of the border). In a great 
number of these criminal offenses it is common to find that Colombian citizens are the 
perpetrators. This adds to the negative perception of Colombian immigrants in Venezuela. 
Generally, the Colombians in Venezuela suffer from a negative reputation that is 
associated with narcotrafficking, robbery, and other types of illegal activity. 
Venezuela is the country with the second highest concentration of Colombian 
prisoners (after the United States). Recently, the Consulado of Colombia in Venezuela 
estimated that there are approximately 2,500 Colombian prisoners in Venezuelan jails.63 
The majority of these prisoners cause internal problems in Venezuelan jails when they try 
to exercise underworld control over the other prisoners through the use of terror and 
violence. Recently, jail disorders occurred in Venezuela at the beginning of 1994 when 
several Colombian prisoners were murdered. 64 The existence of criminal gangs of 
Colombian prisoners was confirmed as well as the fact that they maintained the internal 
control and traffic of drugs and their tendency to exercise diverse kinds of abuses on the 
other prisoners. 
Finally, the governments of Colombia and Venezuela reached an agreement on the 
repatriation of prisoners and the exact number of prisoner exchanges was made known. 
Colombia would repatriate two Venezuelan prisoners that they held while Venezuela was 
going to repatriate more than 2,500 Colombian prisoners. However, the Colombian 
government could not fulfill its part of the agreement due to limitations of its jail 
space.65 
One could conclude from the information provided that the problem of illegal 
Colombian immigration toward Venezuela constitutes an extremely delicate topic in the 
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relationship of the two countries. In Venezuela, there is a feeling of urgency to renovate 
the Law of Immigration and Extranjeria that has been in effect since 1937. Undoubtedly 
times have changed and currently this Law has little to contribute in an urban and 
democratic Venezuela. The new Law of Immigration in Venezuela must consider the 
reality of being a territorial neighbor of Colombia with the problem of illegal 
immigration. The complex and internal Colombian situation concerning the high index 
of violence, crime, narcotrafficking, and guerrilla activity obligate their citizens to seek 
a better horizon. On the other hand, Venezuela faces the meager reality of potential total 
anarchy concerning immigration when an effective policy toward immigration control 
does not exist to help put things in order. In Venezuela it is necessary to set in place an 
effective migratory policy that previously has not existed, currently does not exist, nor has 
it been planned for in the immediate future. Consideration for the creation of Zones of 
Border Security66 is of immediate necessity in order to avoid the incremental growth of 
crimes of all types in the Venezuela and Colombia border region. 
Diverse agreements surrounding border security have been signed between the 
governments of Venezuela and Colombia. In 1991, the Ministers of Defense from both 
countries agreed to meet every six months in order to improve the cooperation between 
Venezuela and Colombia pertaining to drug trafficking and insurgent activities in the 
border region.67 The two nations recognize the strategic significance and national security 
relative to maintaining bilateral relationships in order to gain stability in the frontier 
region. The governments have agreed that the creation of bilateral commissions for 
confronting and resolving the problems of frontier security as well as the creation of 
commissions to obtain border frontier integration can facilitate understanding and 
cooperation between Colombia and Venezuela. 
66 "Colombia-Venezuela: Crisis o Negociaci6n?" Fundaci6n Friedrich Ebert de 
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67 Ibid., p. 89. 
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In Venezuela, the reception of illegal Colombians persists as a reason for 
governmental authorities to ratify their definitions concerning border security policies, 
for a chauvinist position, and to create distrust of the citizens in the democratic 
institutions. However, it is necessary to clarify that decisions and positions taken by the 
Venezuelan government relative to migratory policies (i.e., the nullification ofPresidential 
Decree # 1911) in no manner should be taken as acts of hostility toward Colombian 
citizens (even though the majority of incidents and subsequent actions are based on the 
activities of Colombian nationals). In reality, the decisions of the Venezuelan government 
were and are taken in order to face the serious (and numerous problems of and association 
with the) issue of illegal immigration. 
Venezuela is a recipient of migration and it is interested in the productive human 
resource that come to help in its development. This attitude of interest does not exclude, 
in any form or sense, the Colombian population, which is respected and dear in 
Venezuela. The population that Venezuela does not desire is the inefficient and illegal 
migrant. In reality, it is necessary to clarify that the general denomination of illegal aliens 
not only applies to the Colombian citizens but to all of the surrounding countries. To 
clearly state it: the position against illegal aliens is not automatically an anti-Colombian 
position. 
The matter of illegal Colombian immigration toward Venezuela should be resolved 
with seriousness and maturity on behalf of the two governments. Of course, these 
negotiations should continue to consider the respective national interests of both nations 
but at the same time should seek an all comprehensive form in order to search for 
solutions that better harmonize the interests of the two countries. It is necessary to 
overcome and to remove this painful obstacle in order to enlarge the base of 
understanding between Venezuela and Colombia. 
Finally, relative to the problem of illegal Colombian immigration, the creation 
of a bilateral commission that will work exclusively on the migratory issue is of supreme 
urgency. This initiative should be taken as soon as possible in order to alleviate tensions 
and promote cooperation. However, it is necessary to emphasize that Venezuela's 
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fundamental point, as a sovereign country, is that it has the initiative and fundamental 
right of determining who is (and under what criteria constitutes) a national. No nation 
in the international environment delegates this decision to another. 
C. CROSS-BORDER INSURGENCY 
1. General Overview 
This section analyzes the impact of the cross-border insurgency on the Venezuelan-
Colombian bilateral relationship. Although Colombia's long tradition of democracy 
remains strong, there are some chronic problems with violence generated by guerrilla 
movements which have not shown any progress in the negotiations with the government 
to achieve the pacification of the country. The Venezuelan government perceives the 
Colombian guerilla movement to be a phenomenon that intensifies bilateral tensions 
between the two countries. This is especially due to the different levels of activity in the 
guerrilla movement of the two countries. Previously, in Venezuela, the guerrilla forces 
had completed their cycle and accepted civilian life as their legal status. However, the 
apparent revival (on the national scene) of insurgent groups similar to "Bandera Roja," 
are currently attributed to the influence of the Colombian guerrilla. On the other hand, 
Colombia is suffering the effervescent problem of guerrilla movements, almost analogous 
to a conflict without resolution. 
The nature and constitution of the Venezuelan southwestern border with Colombia 
favors the vitality of guerrilla groups and guerrilla activities. In this area, the border is 
delineated by the Arauca River and most of the vegetation is jungle which offers an ideal 
environment for the development of insurgent activities. However, due to the great 
difficulty of the terrain in the area, internal supply and risk of detection and direct 
confrontation with the Colombian Army during their operations make the search for 
logistic support in the international environment vital to each guerrilla group in the pursuit 
of their goals. In view of the necessity to seek support outside the reach of the 
Colombian internal security system, the geographical area along the Colombian-
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Venezuelan border is considered to be "outlying" of the same, and allows the guerrilla 
greater flexibility for subversive acts. 
The inclusion of guerrilla groups as bodies (institutions) of interest with the 
capacity to pressure, as in the case of Colombia, is due to the fact that in the last few 
years the Colombian guerrilla movement has passed from being a secondary actor on the 
national scene to one of becoming a central actor on the political scene. 68 In reality the 
Colombian guerrilla was transformed into a recognized spokesman for the opposition to 
the government. In 1984 Colombia signed a truce that legitimized the guerrilla movement 
by providing it with the status of a legal belligerent.69 
The levels of Colombian civic participation have increased the convergence70 of 
two processes in the political stage: (1) the growing political role of the guerrilla; (2) 
the emergence of various social movements (the result of the decline of traditional 
political institutions) that consist of groups with high capacity for pressure. Previously, 
these groups had been ignored in the decision-making process. 
2. Origin of Colombian Guerrillas 
The convergence of external and internal factors played an important role in the 
emergence of the guerrilla movement in Colombia.71 The external factors included the 
influence of the Cuban revolution and the intentions of Colombian revolutionaries to apply 
the concept of "guerrilla focus" during the 1960's as a strategy to achieve political power. 
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It also included the effects of the split within the Colombian Communist Party between 
the followers of the Pro-Soviet line and the followers of the Chinese Maoist revolutionary 
ideals. 
Although these external factors promoted the guerrilla movement in Colombia, it 
was the internal factors that allowed the emergence and development of the insurgent 
movement. In Colombia, the intense passion of the political fight between Conservatives 
and Liberals and the struggle for land in the coffee sector degenerated into political 
violence. 72 The price of coffee after WWII increased, making large-scale production 
profitable and squeezing the small growers. In the coffee zones, the period known as "the 
violence" seems to be the ultimate political expression of the ongoing struggle for land 
and social mobility. The "violence" experienced during 1930 to 1948 was not only a 
result of actions taken by the elites. It also can be explained by the desire of the coffee 
workers to obtain control of the land. They sought freedom to plan and execute 
productive work and to enjoy the product of that work through the creation of "Peasant 
Republics." These "Republics" were formed as quasi-independent zones for self-defense 
and self-administration in agrarian matters.73 
This intense period of interparty political violence accelerated with the 
assassination of the populist Liberal leader, Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, on April 9, 1948. The 
assassination resulted in the intensification of the infamous period known as "La 
Violencia." This social phenomenon claimed (generally in the rural areas) the lives of 
more than 200,000 victims in the following twenty years. 
In response to the violence and to the dictatorship of General Gustavo Rojas 
Pinilla (1953-1957), Liberals and Conservatives agreed to a settlement known as the 
72 Charles Berquis, Violence in Colombia, The labor Movement (1930-1946) and 
the Origins of the Violence, Scholarly Resources Inc. Imprint, Wilmington, Delaware, 
p. 51. 
73 Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America, p. 17. 
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National Front.74 The agreement established alternate control of the Presidency and shared 
offices of the ministries from 1958 to 1974. This monopoly by the Conservatives and the 
Liberal parties, through bi-party alternation of the Presidency, resulted in the following 
consequences: the emergence of a special style of authoritarianism and militarism because 
the Colombian Armed Forces became autonomous in the handling of public order; the 
submission of the civilian population in the country to a permanent regimen of exception 
for the institutionalization of a stable form of government; the concentration of power 
with the elites of the two parties; and in general, a new stage in the political struggle 
between the two parties (a bureaucratic confrontation began and displaced the traditional 
ideological scuffling). 
It is necessary to consider the heterogeneity and dispersion of the guerrillas in 
Colombia. The most important Colombian guerrilla movements75 are: the Colombian 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (F ARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the 
Popular Army of Liberation (EPL). The FARC emerged from the old "Peasants 
Republics" and previously were allies of the Colombian Communist Party (PCC). The 
F ARC proposed the concept of grassroot support in the form of a local or regional mode 
of social and peasant warfare. In this case, the guerrilla, the PCC, and the rural 
organization are all mutually reinforced, eventually becoming a regional force. The Army 
of National Liberation (ELN) initially consisted of proto-guerrillas returning from Cuba 
in 1965. The ELN, with the support of university students, established "focos 
guerrilleros," a militaristic extreme without any political direction in the departments of 
Santander and Arauca (both located along the border with Venezuela). The Popular Army 
of Liberation (EPL) consisted predominately of Chinese/Maoist Communist ideologists. 
This movement assumed the thesis of a popular prolonged war from 1967 to 1980 when 
74 John Higley and Richard Gunther, editors, Elites and Democratic Consolidation 
in Latin America and Southern Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 94. 
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they broke with the Maoist ideology and concentrated their action in constructing bases 
of support and enclosing (controlling) the cities in the countryside, primarily in the 
departments of Cordova, Antioquia, and northern Santander (again along the Venezuelan 
border). 
Another important guerilla movement was M-19.76 This group was born in 1972 
by the convergence of sectors expelled from the PCC, the F ARC, and sectors coming 
from the National Popular Alliance (ANAPO-Socialista) during a period of internal crisis 
(when the ANAPO-S considered legitimizing itself to enter the democratic system). M-19 
was one of the more active guerrilla groups during the last years of the movements. Their 
renovating character consisted of trying to make the armed movement a legitimate tool 
to deal with the government and a generator of state proposals (in its efforts, M-19 
utilized its military capability as a factor during negotiations). In addition, M-19 
demonstrated an effective leadership position in the groups of Colombian guerrilla 
movements upon organizing the council "Coordinadora Guerrillera Nacional" (CGN).77 
Counted among its militant membership were the EPL and the ELN, as well as other 
small insurgent groups (i.e., Patria Libre and the Partido Revolucionario de los 
Trabadores, PRT). The role of the CGN was limited to its declaration phase and to a few 
combined military actions, especially in the Colombia-Venezuelan border region. 
However, in early 1990, the CNG was permanently affected when M-19 accepted the 
government's offer of amnesty in exchange for abandoning the armed struggle and agreed 
to participate in the civilian political process. 78 
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3. Tension in the Colombian-Venezuelan Border: Colombian Guerrilla 
Activities 
A product of the guerilla phenomenon is the increasing tensions between the two 
countries beyond that already produced by the continuing maritime dispute over the Gulf 
of Venezuela, the ongoing problem of illegal immigration from Colombia to Venezuela 
(with its social issues), and the transnational crime in the border regions (i.e., contraband 
smuggling and drug trafficking). In addition to already poor disposition toward Colombia 
it is important to add the development of the guerrilla movement. After several years of 
hostile activity (during the 1960's) the guerrilla forces active in Venezuela accepted the 
government's offer of amnesty and began participating in the civilian political arena. This 
pacification policy was implemented during President Rafael Caldera's term (1968-1973) 
and it is considered one of the biggest achievements in the Venezuela's democratization 
process. Undoubtedly, for Venezuela, it is very undesirable to have to resist the 
continuous attacks of Colombian guerrillas in the frontier region despite having resolved 
the guerilla problem in its own national territory. 
Some issues considered critical to the government of Venezuela (and vital to its 
national security) that have also transcended to the forefront of public opinion are: (1) 
the appearance of the guerilla group "Bandera Roja" (and their supposed link with the 
Colombian ELN) on the Venezuelan national stage; (2) the actions of the Colombian 
guerrilla groups, F ARC, ELN, and EPL in the border areas (as the strategic value of the 
border areas is not only in respect to national sovereignty but also for the presence of 
petroleum resources); (3) the so-called "peaceful invasion" of Venezuela by Colombian 
illegal immigrants; (4) the Venezuelan public perception of the Colombian security 
organizations inability or lack of interest in resolving these frontier problems; and (5) the 
advance of the Colombian narcotrafickers into Venezuelan territory. 
For the Colombian guerrilla movements, the Venezuela frontier areas are 
considered "outlying areas" belonging to Colombia and they have provided a favorable 
environment for the development of guerrilla activities. The armed groups ( F ARC, ELN, 
and ELP) have not shown a desire or motivation towards accepting the terms of the offers 
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from the Colombian government for political pacification. In fact, they have tried to 
impose their own conditions. 79 
These guerrilla groups, upon separating themselves completely from the prospect 
of national reconciliation with the government of Colombia, have presented as their own 
answer a total confrontation to the system. Some of their more common actions in the 
border areas are: the sabotaging of pipelines that cause millions in losses to the 
Colombian oil companies and irreparable damages to the environment for both Venezuela 
and Colombia; terrorism (killings and kidnappings) against ranchers, peasants, political 
authorities of both countries who do not want to cooperate or pay the "vacuna" (security 
taxes) to the guerrilla movement; and constant aggression against Venezuelan military 
posts in the border areas. 80 
The southwest region of Venezuela, along the Colombian border, formed by the 
states of A pure and nichira is known as the "hot area." This region, especially the 
riverine area surrounding the Rio Arauca, is where most of the guerrilla activity occurs 
(Fig. 9). The Colombian CNG forces have political control of the Aruaca region. This 
territory is located between El Nula and Guasdalito (Venezuelan border towns) and 
extends toward the frontier. This is a significant strategic problem that affects Colombia 
as much as it does Venezuela. This situation acquires greater relevance especially when 
one considers the current process and means of economic integration being attempted by 
the two nations with Mexico. 81 Venezuela and Colombia have expanded the construction 
of the Carretera Marginal de Ia Jungla (Marginal Jungle Road). Eventually it will unite 
the Andean countries, especially the Colombian!V enezuelan border region, with Bogota 
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and, eventually, with the Venezuelan plains highway. This will allow Colombia to have 
access, via this land bridge, to the Caribbean and the central littoral via the Venezuelan 
state of Zulia. 
There are two important points along the southwest Venezuelan border where most 
of the international commerce in South America will take place. Currently, analysts 
predict that in this region there will be investments of more than one billion bolivars 
before the year 2000.82 One of these points is the route through Cucuta, San Antonio, 
Urefia, and La Fria. This will be in addition to the second zone (also in the southwest 
region) which will extend from Saravena-Arauca in Colombia to Guasdalito-El Nula in 
Venezuela. 
The Boliviarian Marginal Jungle Highway will connect all of the Bolivarian 
countries (from Venezuela to Bolivia) and will reach a length of 7,749 kilometers, 
according to calculations developed by the Council of Cartagena. 
83 It will also provide 
a terrestrial link that will strengthen integration and increase international commerce 
between the South American countries. 
The Arauca region will be an obligatory crossing point of this important 
transnational network. This will strengthen the economic situation of the Venezuelan 
people, located on the riverine area of the Arauca River, where the highway connects the 
plains with the center (southwest) and northern parts of Venezuela. The towns that will 
benefit the most are: Cutufi, El Nula, La Victoria, El Amparo, Guasdalito, and El Pifial. 
However, this economic project could be adversely affected with the presence of 
Colombian insurgent groups. In the last few years these insurgent groups have become 
stronger, with growing influence on the social life, political scene, and economic 
82 
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environment in the Colombian department of Arauca. 84 The insurgent groups assembled 
by the Colombian CNG have achieved a position of political and economic importance 
in the department of the Arauca. They have practically achieved complete control in 
some zones that not even the Colombian Army will dare to enter (although this situation 
is denied by the Colombian government).85 Along the Venezuelan border, in the 
Colombian frontier cities of Saravena, Arauca, and Tibu the guerrilla movement has 
succeeded in notably influencing the behavior of the electorate and has even been able to 
implant some authorities (mayors and other similar positions of regional power). 
This situation in Colombia has become a "natural state" (equilibrium of political 
forces where the guerrilla phenomenon has encroached upon the life of the region) and 
has begun to extend itself into the Venezuelan frontier zones. However, although the 
Colombian guerrillas do not presently have political objectives in Venezuela, the frontier 
zones, especially the southwest, have become since the 1970's, a relief zone for 
Colombian guerrilla forces. Later, the guerrilla forces began military actions against 
frontier posts, specifically armory caches and ammunition depots, resulting in the tragic 
deaths of Venezuelan military members and the loss of weapons and ammunition. At the 
same time, the guerrillas began to pressure the agricultural producers through kidnappings 
and extorsion. 86 
Presently, the guerrillas have consolidated an important social base that allows 
them to control all types of information in the region, consolidate the collection of the 
"vacuna" (security tax) and has now begun to exercise political influence in some areas 
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of sociallife.87 These guerrilla organizations are in reality a powerful political-military 
force with enough organization to exercise control in the southwestern zone of Venezuela 
which is an area of enormous economic potential. 
Since 1990 the Venezuelan ranchers in the southwest, have been trying to reach 
an understanding with the guerrillas over the kidnappings and the collection of the 
"vacuna" (security tax).88 However, one of the aspects that was of greater interest to the 
guerrilla bosses was more knowledge about the economic projections of the Venezuelan 
southwestern region. This interest has also been manifested during communications 
involving kidnappings and ransom. The guerrilla groups remark that in spite of their 
actions, they do not want to interfere with the economic development of the region. 
The Venezuelan territory on the riverine area of the Arauca River consists of 25 
percent of the better agricultural land in the country. However, Venezuela has not been 
able to efficiently develop the region due to poor communication facilities, inadequate 
infrastructure, and the absence of official Venezuelan State authority. 89 
This region also consists of the Forest Reservation of San Camilo (approximately 
110 thousand hectares), the San Camilo water reservoir (that includes the basins of the 
Sarare rivers and the Cutufi, Nula, and Burgua rivers) with a potential of 4.5 million 
cubic meters, and The Tama National Park (with more than 139 thousand hectares of 
land).90 
The areas already in production have 180 thousand hectares of fertile soil under 
agriculture, 774 thousand hectares used for raising livestock in the production of milk 
and meat, and proven energy resources of 4 thousand million barrels of crude (medium 
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and light grades) with a reserve estimated at 14 thousand million barrels (according to an 
exploratory base of resources at Corpoven conducted by the Venezuelan Petroleum 
Corporation). 
Neither has the region's potential in human resources been properly tapped.91 In 
the Venezuelan national census of 1990, the Paez Municipality (political division of the 
region) registered a population of 22,577 inhabitants with a growth appraisal of 10.5 
percent (which represents an average that is three times that of the national average 3.1 
percent).92 Of this population, a third is located in El Nula and La Victoria and they 
constitute the centers for the local economy. In considering only the agricultural sector, 
this population consists of some 4,500 families that generate more than 740 million 
bolivars per year. 
However, the level of urban equipment and infrastructure for providing public 
services to the local population is deficient. The availability of medical personnel is 0.27 
per thousand inhabitants and adequate medical facilities do not exist to support the 
hospital needs of the area. Additionally, the potable water systems and refuse collection 
are also deficient or non-existent. Lastly, the illiteracy rate in the region is 20 percent, 
more than double that of the remainder of the Venezuelan population.93 
This general overview of the region shows that a contrast exists in a land with 
economic potential, located in a national strategic point, but consisting of a population 
almost forgotten by the State. This situation becomes more complex because this part of 
the border is constantly attacked by the Colombian guerrilla movement. Although the 
Paez Municipality does not rely on its own inadequate resources (political, juridical, and 
administrative structure) in order to drive its own development and provide an adequate 
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security policy, its population has made a great effort to transform this land into an 
important national-level center of production for milk and meat products. 
The Venezuelan State is conscious of the frontier situation in the Arauca region 
and has reinforced its security and surveillance means by establishing military bases and 
conducting anti-guerrilla operations. In 1988, the military command, Comando Especifico 
Jose Antonio Paez (CEJAP) was created. This command operated like a policial-military 
organization and integrated all of the security forces in the zone. The Venezuelan 
authorities designed this unit for the sole objective of confronting and eliminating the 
Colombian guerrillas from Venezuela's frontier zones.94 
The CEJAP infiltrated the social bases of the Colombian guerrilla and used the 
infiltrators to provoke armed encounters. This military organization also began the 
process of stripping the nets of Colombian guerrilla informants, drying up their finance 
resources (providing security against kidnapping and extorsion), and eliminating the 
sources of supply (stopping the smuggling of contraband from Venezuela). However, on 
October 29, 1988, members of CEJAP shot to death fourteen Colombian fishermen who 
were apparently guiding a group of Colombian guerrillas in Cano Las Colorados, near the 
Arauca River in Venezuelan territory. The case was tried in military court and, in 1993, 
a prison sentence of seven-and-a-half years was imposed on the 15 defendants for the 
crime of intentional homicide.95 
This meant the end of the CEJAP and its activities in the frontier region. Later, 
the Venezuelan government decided to substitute the CEJAP with a Military Task Force. 
The process of dismantling the guerrilla forces was stopped for a period of time and this 
allowed the Colombian guerrillas to succeed in re-establishing their social bases and 
entrenching their effectiveness against the Venezuelan ranchers. 
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A fundamental difference, from Colombia, is that the Colombian guerrilla does not 
control any portion of Venezuelan territory. Their presence is based on people who have 
won (politically) easy access to the frontier zone. Some are Venezuelan, others are 
Colombian, and others have the two nationalities (dual citizenship). Although the 
guerrillas occasionally execute informers, attack Venezuelan military posts, or carry out 
kidnappings, the fundamental reason for their presence in the frontier zone is to guarantee 
financial funds for their insurgent forces and to exercise political control over the frontier 
population. 96 
The situation on the Colombian side of the border is completely different. The 
people of Saravena, Arauquita, and Arauca are among the most violent in Colombia. The 
guerrillas maintains almost complete control over the region from Arauquita southward. 
This area is considered to be the "liberated zones." The "Mobile Brigades" of the 
Colombian Army specialized in guerrilla warfare occasionally intrude in these territories 
to emplace operatives and enforce their search for guerrillas. When that happens, the 
guerrillas fall back and only confront the military patrols when it is absolutely inevitable 
or advantageous, primarily by way of an ambush. The guerrillas rely on their great 
influence in the rural zones where they recruit the majority of their combatants, in some 
cases by force. After the military operation, the Colombian "Mobile Brigades" leave the 
zone. Meanwhile, social bases on which the rebels lean remain intact. 
In the Arauca region, the Colombian CNG has succeeded in exercising a degree 
of control that includes the regional authorities. The CNG has succeeded in controlling 
whole frontier populations in the departments of Arauca, Arauquita, Tibu, and Sardinata. 
In these departments, the mayors have completely been submitted through intimidation.97 
The intimidation begins from the moment the candidates announce their candidacy and 
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intent to campaign for office. The candidates are required to submit their programs or 
policies for government to the guerrillas for their consideration. The guerrillas then either 
approve or reject them. Those candidates that do not submit to the terms of the guerrillas, 
are expected to abandon their aspirations for office. If they do not follow the rules 
imposed by the guerrilla and instead continue to follow the electoral process, they run the 
risk of being executed or at least being kidnapped. All of the decisions that should be 
taken by the mayors in the Colombian frontier regions must be endorsed by the guerrillas. 
The Colombian authorities have constantly denied that this situation exists for the 
southeastern regions. They have reiterated that the guerrilla does not control any portion 
of Colombian territory. However, facts indicate that it is not necessary to physically 
occupy territory in order to exercise complete dominance of a zone. 
One of the military objectives of the guerrillas established in Arauca has been the 
Colombian oil companies. These companies initially consented to pay the "vacuna" 
(security tax) to the guerrillas in order to avoid having their installations attacked by the 
insurgent groups. 98 
However, in 1986 the Colombian petroleum corporations stopped paying the 
security tax. In response, the ELN began a series of continuous attacks against the 
pipeline that carries petroleum from Arauca to Puerto de Covefias. The pipeline covers 
a distance of more than 762 kilometers that must cross two guerrilla-infested zones inside 
of Colombia: Arauca and Northern Santander. During the period, 1986 to 1992, there 
have been 130 attacks on the pipeline. A result of these acts of sabotage has been 
spillages totalling more than 270,400 barrels of petroleum with annual losses of more than 
6 million dollars.99 
These acts of sabotage on Colombian soil have affected the Venezuelan river basin 
on the Catatatumbo River. Petroleos de Venezuela Sociedad Anonima (PDVSA) has had 
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to implement the Binational Plan for Contingencies, 100 signed in 1989 with Colombia, on 
eleven occasions in order to gather 19,286 barrels of petroleum that entered Venezuela 
through the Catatumbo River. The last attack, during May, 1994, was the region's most 
recent environmental disaster. 
The ELN is the primary guerrilla movement that has taken the initiative in 
conducting acts of sabotage in the Venezuelan southwestern region. It has succeeded in 
consolidating as much economic, political, and social power in the department of Arauca 
as it has in the north of Santander. Every time the Colombian government announces 
increases in the cost of fuel or announces punitive measures against worker strikes, the 
ELN carries out an act of sabotage against the oil pipeline. The ELN has declared, in 
their manifestos, that they carry out acts of sabotage in order to generate employment for 
the peasants who will be employed in the recovery of the spilled petroleum. 101 
The coordination of frontier security (between Venezuela and Colombia) has only 
been partially effective although several agreements of cooperation between the Armed 
Forces of the two nations have been signed. In November, 1993, President Velasquez' 
administration notified the Colombian authorities of its uneasiness concerning repeated 
guerrilla attacks on Venezuelan territory, which had claimed the lives of five armed forces 
members on November 18. Additionally, on November 11, four members ofVenezuela's 
National Guard were wounded, presumably by guerrillas, in an earlier attack near the 
border. 102 News released from Colombia indicated that the guerrilla attacks were 
specifically directed at the National Guard based on the fact that an Army patrol had 
passed through the area shortly before the incident occurred. The group identified as 
being the most likely responsible for the attack was the ELN. This group has in the past 
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claimed responsibility for similar attacks on National Guardsmen as reprisals against 
presumed abuses suffered by Colombian illegal immigrants. 103 In response to the incident, 
Colombian military authorities stated that "Our problem is to fight guerrillas in our own 
country. We do not conduct joint operations with the Venezuelan Armed Forces, rather 
we confine ourselves to coordinated operations. Each individual army and police force 
is responsible for their own respective country. Crossing the border is considered a 
violation. "104 
The presence of guerrillas along the border has also sparked allegations by 
Colombian officials concerning the involvement of members of the Venezuelan military 
in the sale of illegal arms and other contraband to Colombian guerrillas. In January, 
1994, weapons from the Venezuelan Armed Forces were seized from FARC guerrillas by 
Colombian troops stationed in the border town of Villavicencio. The weapons consisted 
of F AL assault rifles, the standard regulation weapon of the Venezuelan military. The 
F AL assault rifles had been painted to hide their origin. Along with the eighty assault 
rifles seized in the region, the Colombian forces have seized mortars, ammunition, and 
submachine guns. 105 
Furthermore, two former guerrillas (who had turned themselves in to Colombian 
authorities) made statements implicating that members of the Venezuelan military are 
involved in the sale of contraband and weapons to the ELN and F ARC movements. One 
of the individuals cited a specific instance when a member of the Venezuelan military 
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provided ten machine guns (UZI) in exchange for 120 kilos of cocaine and 40 kilos of 
"bazuco," a cocaine derivative. 106 
To date, Venezuela's official stance has been that any weapons seized have been 
stolen from border garrisons and other secondary posts during the two Venezuelan coup 
attempts in 1992. Due to the implications, the flow of Venezuelan weapons into 
Colombia poses a serious threat to the internal security of both countries, regardless of 
the circumstances. 
In January 1994, a significantly more serious incident occurred when Colombian 
airspace was violated by a Venezuelan helicopter. This incident was exacerbated by the 
fact that it followed on the heels of recent Venezuelan prison riots during which several 
Colombian prisoners were killed; and, there was talk of pardons for the military personnel 
involved in the Amparo massacre (14 Colombians were killed by government forces in 
1988). According to Venezuelan authorities, the National Guard helicopter (initially 
involved) was on a routine border patrol tracking Colombian guerrillas, and in the 
process, violated Colombian airspace. The helicopter received ground fire, became 
disabled, and was forced to crash land on Colombian soil. Subsequently, the crew was 
rescued by a second Venezuelan helicopter. 107 The Colombian version, alleged that the 
National Guardsmen in the Venezuelan helicopter had mistaken a group of local fishermen 
for guerrillas, landed, and apprehended seven men from the group. The helicopter 
attempted to take off with the prisoners but crash landed due to the excessive weight. 
Both countries continued to stand by their respective versions of the incident. Venezuelan 
reaction to the incident has been to downplay its importance and blame Colombia for its 
inability to exercise authority and control over its border regions. 
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Colombian reaction was complicated by three additional factors: (1) the ongoing 
electoral campaign (each candidate was calling upon President Gaviria to adopt a forceful 
stance); (2) Gaviria's own campaign to solicit support among members (of the OAS) for 
the upcoming position of Secretary General for the Organization of American States; and 
(3) both countries were scheduled to sign a major free trade agreement on the twentieth 
of the month. Perhaps, in response to the last two, President Gaviria chose a moderate 
approach. He sent a strongly worded communique requesting that Venezuelan authorities 
conduct an investigation followed by legal action against those found responsible. 
Simultaneously, President Gaviria attempted to diffuse the incident by emphasizing the 
importance and success of the ongoing bilateral negotiations. Subsequently, an agreement 
was reached by both Presidents to hold a meeting of senior members (from both 
governments) from the Departments of Defense, Interior, and Foreign Affairs in order to 
discuss and seek some mechanism for the preservation of border security. Additionally, 
Colombia indicated that it would militarize its frontier region in order to exercise better 
control over the border districts. 108 
Colombian guerrillas were responsible for ten intrusions into Venezuelan territory 
between May 19, 1993, and May 4, 1994.109 The intrusions resulted in attacks on six 
Venezuelan military outposts, two marines dead, one marine wounded, and twenty-two 
National Guardsmen wounded. Venezuela estimates that Colombian guerrillas have killed 
about 50 Venezuelan military personnel during the past 15 years. 
Venezuelan security agencies and governmental authorities that specialize in 
national security and defense issues have analyzed the methodology used by the 
Colombian guerrillas to exercise political, economic, and social control in the Arauca 
region. Two of these agencies, the National Council for State Security and Defense 
108 "Colombia asegura que Venezuela violo su espacio aereo y causo daiios 
materiales," Diario 2001, Editorial De Armas, Caracas, Venezuela, January 13, 1994, 
p. 7. 
109 "Ataques de la guerrilla colombiana en territorio Venezolano 1993-1994," 
Diario El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, September 11, 1994. 
55 
(SECONASEDE) and the Ministry of State for Border Issues, both support and advise the 
Organization for Law, Security, and Defense concerning the establishment of policy on 
the issue of frontier security. 
In Venezuela, several bills, concerning the development of the frontier regions, 
have been presented to the Congress of the Republic. These bills contain regulations that 
are intended to motivate Venezuelans to relocate to the frontier regions, thus, driving and 
ensuring its development. However, these bills have not been approved and the current 
environment of insecurity that is in the border region (primarily from Colombian guerrilla 
activity) has created a problem of a lack of motivation and mobilization by the masses to 
work in these regions. 
Although Venezuela is actually submerged in an economic crisis that affects all 
national sectors, it is necessary that plans for security, defense, and the development of 
the frontier are executed in a concerted, concrete, and effecient manner. This must be 
done with the support of Venezuela's National Congress and in accordance with internal 
laws. The construction and provision of basic services, availability of doctors in the 
frontier the local population, and mutual cooperation between the governments of 
Venezuela and Colombia must be accomplished in order to strip the guerrilla movements 
of their influence and stop their subversive activity in the border region. 
D. DRUG TRAFFICKING 
1. Historical Background 
The production and consumption of drugs in Colombia as well as Bolivia and Peru 
has a longstanding history in the region. Although the indigenous populations have 
cultivated and consumed coca for hundreds of years on a minor scale, cultivation of 
marijuana is a recent phenomenon. During the 1930's, for the first time, cultivation of 
marijuana on the Colombian Caribbean coast began to be observed. The North American 
market demand, during the 1960's, provoked the peak of marijuana production in 
Colombia. Colombia, a peripheral supply source, gained control as the primary supplier 
to the United States. This occurred during the mid 1970's when Mexico implemented 
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strict anti-narcotics campaigns in response to strained political relations with the U.S. 
administrations. Drug trafficking and illegal immigration problems prompted the United 
States to increase pressure on the Mexican government. Mexican drug suppliers were 
forced to suspend trafficking and attempt to develop new strategies. Colombia's drug 
traffickers used the weakened state of the Mexican drug lords and seized control of the 
drug market. By the end of the 1970's, Colombia accounted for approximately 70 percent 
of the marijuana that was reaching the United States. 110 The main centers of production 
were located in the Guajira Peninsula and in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta mountain 
range. 
The economic boom created by the illegal export of drugs to the United States 
brought an atmosphere of prosperity and comfort to the Colombian Caribbean cities of 
Barranquilla, Riohacha, and Santa Marta. However, at the same time, the region of the 
Peninsula of Guaj ira began to experience acts of violence and corruption began to appear 
in the agencies responsible for state security. 111 The drug traffickers convinced the 
farmers to substitute marijuana plantations for traditional crops, i.e., bananas. 
Additionally, many legitimate businesses were bought (hotels, banks, airlines, and 
restaurants) by the drug traffickers and used for money laundering. 
The production and traffic of cocaine in Colombia also developed because of the 
North American market demand for the drugs. At the beginning of the 1970's the pasta 
of the coca was brought from Bolivia and Peru to Colombia for processing into 
marketable cocaine. Although the Colombian agricultural sector did not start producing 
coca until 1978, by 1983 Colombia had established itself not only as the leading producer 
and distributor of cocaine, but as the leader in coca cultivation as well. Colombia's coca 
plantations reached an excess of 25,000 hectares under cultivation. 112 
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At the start of the 1980's, the traffic of cocaine generated criminal organizations 
that represent, even today, a serious internal security problem. 113 The decade of the 
1980's became known as the "Era ofthe Narco-Terrorism." Various government officials 
were assassinated for their efforts to carry out anti-narcotic laws. Among the murdered 
officials were: a Minister of Justice, the former head of the Anti-narcotics Police, several 
Supreme Court Judges, as well as numerous police personnel and lower-court judges. 
The Colombian government has made a strong effort to fight against the 
narcotraffickers. President Julio Turbay Ayala (1978-1982) carried out several campaigns 
against the drug dealers. He used military personnel to destroy marijuana fields and 
signed an extradition treaty with the United States. President Belisario Betancourt 
(1982-1986) declared the "war without mercy" in 1984 after his Minister of Justice was 
assassinated by the Medellin Cartel. In 1988, President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) 
recommitted the military forces to the interdiction effort (a measure that President 
Betancourt had suspended). President Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) announced the policy 
of reduced punishments for those who turned themselves in. This procedure was used 
with the Medellin Cartel's former leader, Pablo Escobar Gaviria, who selected his own 
place of reclusion, with all of the attendant comforts. He then escaped from there and 
was ultimately shot to death by Colombian security agencies in December 1993. 
In the June 1994 presidential election, Liberal Party candidate Dr. Ernesto Samper 
was elected even though he was allegedly involved in a drug scandal. The scandal 
revolves around the appearance of certain tapes now known as "los narco-tapes" where 
a reference is made to economic contributions to his political campaign made by the 
narcotraffickers. 114 The candidate of the Conservative Party, Andres Pastrana narrowly 
lost the election, and was also allegedly involved in the scandal. His name was mentioned 
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in one of "los narco-tapes." An article entitled "The Narcocandidato?" published in Time 
on July 4, 1994, included a taped conversation (recorded during the second round of the 
Colombian presidential elections) between the journalist Albert Giraldo Lopez and 
Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, one of the leaders of the Cali Cartel, which controls the 80 
percent of the worldwide cocaine traffic. The day after the elections, three tapes 
containing the conversations between Giraldo and Rodriguez were published in Bogota, 
placing the legitimacy of Sam per's election in doubt and sinking Colombia into political 
turbulence. Before the vote, copies of the tapes had also arrived in the hands of U.S. 
officials; and their decision not to initiate some or any legal action created a great 
controversy in Washington. 115 On the side, while the Colombian Department of State 
agreed with President Gaviria's decision to not make the tapes public, some of the 
officials of the agency, Direccion de Control de Drogas (a counter-drug agency), did not 
hide their displeasure. Both Dr. Samper and Mr. Pastrana have denied receiving any 
campaign money from drug-trafficking organizations. 
2. Colombia's Drug Trafficking and Implications for Venezuela's National 
Security 
Venezuela does not produce drugs, but is an important transit area for drugs 
headed from Colombia to Europe and the United States. Between 1990 and the first four 
months of 1994, Venezuelan security agencies seized more than 33 thousand kilos of 
drugs and detained more than 60 thousand people for possession and trafficking of 
drugs.116 
In the Arauca frontier region, the situation gets more complicated due to the action 
of Colombian rebel groups. The largest, best-trained, and best-equipped insurgent group 
in Colombia, the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces (F ARC), collected taxes from 
drug traffickers and coca growers in exchange for protection or surveillance. In 1984, 
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F ARC determined that the drug trade was a prosperous enterprise and entered the drug 
industry itself. 117 
In the Venezuelan and Colombian frontier region that borders the Amazon the 
situation continues to become more complicated due to the operations carried out by the 
Colombian narcotraffickers. The secret laboratories for the processing of the drug have 
been relocated to the sectors of Vichada and Guainia where the work is easier, given the 
minute presence of the Colombian security forces. In Puerto Ayacucho (Venezuela) there 
has been a notable increase in the movement of money and amounts of armament (Fig 
1 0). South of the city, roads built by the narcotraffickers to transport their merchandise 
across the Orinoco river have been discovered. 118 Other routes have also been 
encountered toward the north, near the towns of Puerto Paez and Puerto Carrefio 
(Colombia) and several other towns in the department of Vichada. Previously, the people 
of the region failed to denounce these acts for fear of reprisals. However, the greater fear 
of a "Colombianization" of the serene and calm life that surrounds the Amazon provoked 
a stronger desire for cooperation with local authorities in combating the illicit drug related 
activities in the region. 119 One of the problems that affects the interdiction of drugs in the 
area is the utilization of the Orinoco river by the drug traffickers for exporting drugs to 
the United States and Europe (Fig 11). The Orinoco River is an international waterway 
according to an agreement signed by both Venezuela and Colombia. The agreement 
allows the free, uninterrupted flow of traffic and ships between the two countries and 
towards the Atlantic Ocean. 
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• Puerto Avacucho. 
Figure 10. Location of Puerto Ayacucho (Amazonas state) Venezuela. 
Caribbean Sea. Via U.S. Via Eurnpe. 
COLOMBIA. 
Figure 11. Utilization of the Orinoco River by the drug traffickers for exporting drugs from 
Colombia to the United States and Europe. 
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On the other side, in the mountain range of Sierra de Perija (which defines the 
Northwestern border between Venezuelan with Colombia in the state of Zulia) a 
resurgence in the cultivation of marijuana has been observed, while the cultivation of coca 
remains unchanged. 120 The resurgence of marijuana cultivation in Colombia has worried 
the Colombian authorities and is presumed to coincide with increment in marijuana 
exports to the United States. During 1993, the Colombian National Police seized 93 tons 
of marijuana and destroyed more than 100 hectares cultivated with the illicit grass. 121 
The narcotraffickers, feeling the increased pressure exercised by the Colombian 
security agencies, began to move their bases of operation from Colombian territory toward 
the neighboring countries Ecuador, Brazil, and Venezuela. 122 The relative success of the 
Colombian pacification policy and the progressive dismantling of the drug cartels has also 
contributed to the new relocation of these secret laboratories and the farmlands under drug 
cultivation. The statements of Colombia's former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mrs. 
Noemi Sanin de Rubio concerning the "difficult environment" that would be in Colombia 
towards the production of illegal substances and the actions that would be taken by the 
narcotraffickers in their search for spaces of greater permissiveness corroborate the 
intentions of the criminal organizations that operate in those regions. 123 The Cali Cartel 
is considered to be the major world organization dedicated to the smuggling of cocaine. 
According to reports from the Colombian National Police, the cartel has extended its 
trafficking network to Brazil, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama. The cartel has developed 
large cultivated tracts of coca in the vicinities of: Puerto Ayacucho, in the Venezuelan 
120 
"Aument6 cultivo de marihuana en la frontera con Colombia," El Diario de 
Caracas, Caracas, Venezuela, March 24, 1994. p. 25. 
121 
"Precisan sembradios de marihuana y coca en el Alto Guasare," El Universal, 
Caracas, Venezuela, February 17, 1994, pp. 2-28. 
122 
"Cartel de Cali ampli6 red de narcotrafico en Venezuela," El Diario de Caracas, 
Caracas, Venezuela, January 24, 1994, p. 23. 
123 
"Existe un Plan para trasladar Centros de Droga a Venezuela," El Nacional, 
Caracas, Venezuela, June 16, 1994, pp. 2-17. 
62 
Orinoco region, and in several areas of the Brazilian Amazon. In Ecuador, the Cartel has 
succeeded in establishing their illegal transportation network to send shipments to the 
United States via the Pacific Ocean. In Panama, especially in the Colon zone, the Cartel 
carries out large transactions of drug money. The Cartel also launders money in 
Argentina and Chile. 124 The danger is that Venezuela, like other countries that share a 
border with Colombia, runs the risk of being converted into a producer of drugs. This 
is in addition to the problems that already exists with the illegal transit of drugs through 
Venezuelan territory enroute to international markets. 
The Director of Operations, General Staff of the Armed Forces of Venezuela, 
estimates that more than 50 tons of drugs transit annually through Venezuela. 125 Of this 
figure, the Venezuelan National Guard only succeeded in capturing an estimated 10 
percent. This provides an indication of the size and seriousness of the problem. The 
problem becomes more complicated when one realizes' that controls do not exist in 
Colombia on importing chemical products that are necessary to process the drug. This 
situation induces the smuggling of chemicals from Venezuela, where, in spite of 
supposedly strict controls, the authorities have not been successful in controlling 
smuggling across the border. 
International organizations have called attention to the high level of heroin traffic 
from Colombia through Venezuela. According to conclusions in a United Nations report, 
completed by the Program of International Monitoring of Drugs (PNUFID), the growing 
traffic in heroin has its base of operations already established in Colombia and Mexico. 126 
From 1992 to 1994, one can observe that the appearance of heroin in Latin America is 
due to the growing demand in the United States and Europe. In North American cities 
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such as San Francisco and New York, where cocaine was the drug of first choice, the use 
of heroin has replaced it as the principal drug of consumption. The narcotraffic 
organizations have reacted to this demand by boosting the prices of heroin, and also 
promoting the substitution of coca products for poppy derivatives. This is due to the 
existence of a gigantic stock of cocaine, coca paste, and coca leaf. It is estimated that the 
land under coca cultivation, in the countries located along the Andean region, consist of 
an area of approximately 400 thousand hectares. 127 Additionally, the income potential in 
the production of heroin is overwhelming. While a kilo of cocaine could reach 30 
thousand dollars on the North American market, a kilo of heroin costs 300 thousand 
dollars. A change in the Cartel's priorities is seen in Venezuela, where a large increase 
in the seizure of heroin during the first quarter of 1994 (2,975 kilos) was observed, while 
in previous years the amount seized was insignificant. 
A report from the United Nations, published in January 1993, concludes that the 
drug cartels consider Venezuela a "monetary paradise" for trafficking and laundering of 
drug money. 128 Before the Venezuelan government established the economic measures 
to combat the fiscal crisis of July 1994, which included the control of international 
exchange, among other things, there wasn't any type of control for suspicious deposits 
that would help any timely financial investigation. The Venezuelan financial system is 
open, liberal, and relatively free of regulation which facilitates the laundering of drug-
related dollars. 
Since 1987, millions of dollars have been invested in Venezuela in the construction 
of resorts and other tourist developments on Margarita Island and Puerto La Cruz, without 
any requirement for reporting the source of that capital. Equally, despite Venezuela's 
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current economic crisis, the Ministry de Hacienda has discovered that just in the years 
between 1987 to 1993, automobile imports with a value of 3 thousand million dollars 
have entered the country. 
The extent of money laundering in Venezuela is difficult to determine. Banking 
laws have been generally lax, although efforts are currently under way to implement more 
stringent regulations. In 1991, U.S. agencies estimated that at least $3 billion per year 
were being laundered in the country. 129 The most common methods include: 
construction, investment in hotels and nightclubs, purchases of gold and other precious 
metals, and real estate speculation. During the first trimester in 1993 an estimated $700 
million was laundered by a single group known as the CONAR group. This group 
consisted of three aluminum exporting companies, a small airline of 11 planes, various 
trucking companies, and six estates. 130 Laundering is generally accomplished through 
electronic transfers. Funds from Venezuela are subsequently transferred and deposited in 
European and U.S. bank accounts. 
The effects of these money laundering operations have been devastating on the 
Venezuelan economy. The U.S Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) warned, in April1994, 
that Venezuela faces the closure of a great quantity of legitimate companies in the sectors 
of construction, tourism, and agriculture due to the impact of the companies dedicated to 
laundering money. 131 Legally, these companies can use their revenue to break their 
competitors and force them into foreclosure. 
In Colombia, the flow of dollars coming from the drug trade has driven the 
reevaluation of local currency, to the point that local products stop being competitive in 
129 U.S. General Accounting Office, "The Drug War: Extent of Problems in 
Brazil, Ecuador, and Venezuela," National Security and International Affairs Division, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,1992, p. 5. 
130 "La Droga Colombiana encuentra tropiezos en Venezuela," El Universal, 
Caracas, Venezuela, February 4, 1994, pp. 1-2. 
131 "CIA: Narcotrafico quiebra empresas en Venezuela," El Diario de Caracas, 
Caracas, Venezuela, April 27, 1994, p. 38. 
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the international market. Also, the control of legitimate private corporations went 
increasingly into the hands of drug cartels. Using legitimate businesses as fronts for 
laundering money and to cover illicit activities was beneficial for all involved, and helped 
make the traffickers untouchable. As a result, the vast sums of illicit money created from 
narcotics trafficking actually established a "parallel" economy with which the national 
government could not compete. 
In Venezuela, it has been quite difficult to establish controls that detect the laundry 
of drug money due to the customary movement of dollars. The legal movement of large 
sums of money is observed in the country due to its role as a petroleum producer and also 
that of a traditional exporter of other minerals (i.e., iron, aluminum, and steel) to the 
United States. During May 1994, the Venezuelan judge Mildred Camero suggested that 
Pablo Escobar Gaviria, the deceased leader of the Medellin Cartel, had invested in the 
Caracas stock exchange. 132 
A dilemma that affects each of these countries as much as drug production and 
drug trafficking is the fight against corruption. In Colombia, although there are many 
factors that contribute to the development of corruption, there are two important analytical 
factors: (1) financial benefit, and (2) survival. 133 In 1989, the Colombian military 
released 2,100 personnel including 130 officers. The Colombian National Police released 
over two thousand police officers including the former commander of the National 
Police. 134 Offenses ranged from corruption related, to drug trafficking, to participation 
in terrorist attacks. In 1993, the Colombian Attorney General's Office reported that the 
officers assigned to prison duty while Pablo Escobar Gaviria was incarcerated received 
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500,000 pesos each in exchange for the entry of vehicles, portable phones, and other 
items. 135 
In Colombia, between 1981 and 1989, 45 percent of all attacks and violent crimes 
were drug-related. During 1987, there were 16,200 homicides with an average of 52.8 
murders per 100,000 people (the fourth highest average ever recorded in the world)Y6 
In Venezuela, the number of drug-related arrests and scandals involving 
government officials is symptomatic of the corruption that is penetrating its institutions. 
In 1991, a former governor of Caracas, Adolfo Ramirez Torres, was arrested on charges 
of participating in an international cocaine-smuggling ring. In 1992, Brigadier General 
Ramon Alexis Sanchez, an assistant military attache assigned to Venezuela's Embassy in 
Washington, was arrested in Miami, Florida, by U.S. authorities for accepting 55 pounds 
of cocaine from DEA agents. In the course of a yearlong investigation, the Brig. General 
had negotiated the shipment of half a ton of cocaine from Venezuela to the United 
States. 137 However, perhaps the most disturbing incident to date involves the "accidental" 
presidential pardon of the drugtrafficker, Larry Tovar, in the fall of 1993. Tovar was 
among a group of 17 people, detained in 1989 for possession of cocaine by Venezuelan 
authorities. A member of the "Euro-American Conexion," he was extensively involved 
in the shipment of drugs to Europe, Canada, and the United States. While awaiting 
sentencing of up to 20 years in prison, and following various unsuccessful bribe attempts 
and death threats against the judge and prosecution, Tovar was inexplicably released on 
a presidential pardon which was later determined to have been illegally processed and 
obtained. The personal secretary of President Velasquez who obtained the President's 
signature without his full knowledge, was implicated. By the time a new arrest warrant 
135 Daily Report: Latin America, FBIS-LAT-93-176, Foreign Broadcast 
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was issued for his recapture, Tovar had fled the country, presumably to Colombia. 138 The 
incident caused great embarrassment to the Velasquez administration; discredited the 
Minister of Justice; and raised unsettling questions concerning the extent of drug related 
corruption within the Venezuelan government. 
In September 1994, Larry Tovar was detained in Colombia and even though he 
tried to hide his true identity, a check on his fingerprints confirmed that he was the 
narcotrafficker that was previously and erroneously pardoned by the Venezuelan 
government. He is actually awaiting the disposition of the Colombia's General Attorney 
Office on the requests for extradition from the governments of Venezuela and the United 
States. 
In view of the threat that the drug problem represents for Venezuela, the 
government has begun to consider the militarization of the anti-drug campaign as a 
priority of the State. 139 It is impossible to establish the quantity of drugs that pass through 
Venezuela, enroute to international markets, but the following examples reflect the 
magnitude of the problem provided: (1) in December 1991, 15,000 kilos of cocaine, 
worth 79 million dollars were discovered in Miami. The cocaine was hidden in concrete 
parts sent from Venezuela; (2) in December of the same year, 2,700 kilos of cocaine, 
worth 14 million dollars were confiscated in New Jersey. The drug shipment was hidden 
in aluminum ingots sent from Venezuela; (3) in February 1994, more than 3,000 kilos 
of cocaine, worth 15 million dollars were discovered in Holland. The drug was hidden 
in aluminum structures sent from Venezuela; and finally, (4) in April 1994, another drug 
shipment valued in more than 375 million dollars was discovered in England, the drug 
was hidden in barrels of petroleum sent from Venezuela. 
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The fight against drugs cannot be unilateral in nature. For example, in the case 
of Latin America, drug trafficking is a multinational business. The situation in Bolivia 
and Peru is also alarming as far as production is concerned. Venezuela does not have 
enough of a police infrastructure to confront the narcotraffickers and that is why the 
government is studying the possibility of militarizing the fight against drugs. In the past, 
the policies of the Venezuelan government in the fight against the narcotraffickers have 
suffered from poor planning and execution. Narcotrafficking is considered a threat to 
Venezuela's national sovereignty. There are many threats to national security such as 
deteriorating public health, ruining the environment, laundering money, corruption, and 
finally, culminating in violence that will represent a danger to the stability of the 
democratic institutions. 
An attack on a Colombian police helicopter carrying a number of senior U.S and 
Colombian officials, which came under fire from gunmen guarding cocaine laboratories 
in the jungles of Caqueta, south-west Colombia, on September 22, has been used by 
Colombia's President Ernesto Samper to draw international attention to Colombia's huge 
drug-trafficking problem and the commitment of the new government to combat it. 
The cooperation between Venezuela and Colombia should undertake all levels of 
the judicial and executive systems in order to facilitate the extradition of narcotraffickers 
and should include the integration of the information and intelligence services of each 
nation in order to confront and overwhelm the powerful criminal organizations that 
manage the drug trafficking. The agreements signed by both governments upon drug 
trafficking have not been effective at all. A greater effort in bilateral actions against drug 
traffickers must be done in order to strength the capacity of Colombia and Venezuela to 
enforce laws and authority in all levels over the war against drugs. 
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Til. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. SECURITY 
Latin America, especially the Caribbean and Central America, has a unique ability 
to directly affect U.S. security and well-being, primarily because of its proximity (and 
economic ties) to the United States. The security of Latin America and the United States 
is linked in many ways. In recent decades, the Caribbean has triggered many U.S. 
military responses. The difficulty with keeping the region in consistent policy focus 
perhaps has been worse in the last ten years because of the United States' deepened 
involvement in Central America. The interaction of security issues (drug trafficking, 
illegal immigration, environmental degradation, and political stability) is a complex and 
controversial one. Yet, as the history ofU.S. military intervention suggests, the tendency 
is to overlook the region's problems until the moment of crisis (i.e., Cuba and Haiti with 
their refugee crises in 1993-1994). 
Although the world is less dangerous now than during the Cold War, security in 
the Caribbean is in many respects more complex and uncertain. At the end of the Cold 
War, the dangers of conflict erupting more freely among local actors could increase. The 
potential rises of regional aggressors and the potential for crises stemming from instability 
in the Caribbean region could present the United States with many difficult security 
issues. The proximity of the Caribbean to the United States is an important factor in 
analyzing both its vulnerability and its instability. The true problem for the United States 
is presented in the serious inability of many regional governments in appropriately 
addressing and resolving more complex social, economic, and political problems. These 
problems have been characterized by the ease in which they are politicized and turned 
against the legitimate governments, which in turn creates a crisis in the security and 
stability of the region. In confronting this situation, the behavior of the United States is 
generally classified as "interventionist," involving itself in the internal matters of many 
regional nations. However, in reality these crises generate difficult and non-traditional 
threats framed within U.S. security concerns. Therefore, some of the nations in the region 
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see the United States as a key solution to their problems but, at the same time, its 
"intervention" can be perceived as a greater problem for their national interests. 
In the past, South America has had several conflicts because of territorial disputes, 
for example: between Ecuador and Peru; and the Falklands conflict in the South Atlantic. 
These rivalries and disputes, including Bolivia's claims for access to the sea, are often 
used by the military to justify arms purchases, and, in more serious cases, become a factor 
for democratic destabilization (i.e., the maritime dispute between Colombia and Venezuela 
over the rights in the Gulf of Venezuela). In 1992, the maritime dispute over the Gulf 
of Venezuela was one of the factors precipitating the attempted coup by a nationalistic 
faction of the Venezuelan Army against President Carlos Andres Perez. 
Venezuela and Colombia are considered to be a part of South America. However, 
at the same time, they are considered to be countries within the Caribbean Basin that 
share (along with the neighboring smaller nations) a high degree of dependence on the 
North American market. 
The maritime dispute between Colombia and Venezuela (over rights in the Gulf 
of Venezuela) is an example of a territorial dispute that becomes more complex when a 
valuable resource, oil, becomes involved. This territorial dispute is a product of 
ambiguity with the actual trace of the border after the breakup of Greater Colombia, in 
1830, and equally to the inability of the two governments to agree on the application of 
the Law of the Sea. The expansion of economic projects in the Caribbean, the petroleum 
resources that the zone possesses, and the control of a strategic area for maritime passages 
(control the passage of crafts through the Gulf Venezuela) defines the conflict as 
geopolitical. 
Venezuela and Colombia possess a moderate military force that is respectable in 
the Caribbean region. Although the Colombian Armed Forces are larger in number than 
the Venezuelan forces, the Venezuelan military forces are considered to be among the 
better trained and equipped forces in South America. Colombia's defense problems are 
complicated by the actions of the guerilla movements and the fact that their activities 
facilitated the development of the narcotraffic criminal organizations. 
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On the other hand, the relationship between the two countries and the United 
States are also different. In the 1950's, Colombia distinguished itself in being the only 
Latin American country that sent troops and naval units to Korea to support the United 
States in that conflict. However, since the 1970's, Colombia has experienced a high 
increase in drug related activities (cultivation and export of illegal drugs), in meeting the 
growing demand in the United States. Subsequently, towards the end of the 1970's and 
beginning of the 1980's, the cycle began in the trafficking of cocaine and has had 
devastating effects at every level in the United States. This phenomenon has resulted in 
medium tensions between the two countries. Tensions occasionally escalate, especially 
when the United States demands that Colombia exert a stronger effort in the fight against 
drugs. At the same time, Colombia discloses the sacrifices that it has already experienced 
and demands that the United States, as the consumer country, acknowledge its 
responsibilities and controls its own actions. Additionally, it is necessary to recognize 
the geographical importance that Colombia represents for the United States. Colombia 
occupies a strategic position in that it has an east coast on the Caribbean Sea, a larger 
west coast on the Pacific Ocean, and is located just south of Panama, near the Panama 
Canal. The Colombian eastern littoral, the coast that meets the Caribbean Sea, is where 
the cultivation and traffic of drugs towards the United States began to develop and 
persists. In the urban centers of Santa Marta, Barranquilla, and Cartagena the 
narcotrafficking has succeeded in controlling important economic and political levels. 
This situation, without any doubt, constitutes a factor of insecurity for the Panama Canal, 
as it is the means by which the transfer or shipment of drugs (from one part to another) 
occurs. 
In respect to Venezuela, it is important to remember that it is one of the most 
important providers of petroleum to the United States. In the Gulf of Venezuela, 
specifically in Lake Maracaibo, one finds the majority of oil fields that generate 75 
percent of Venezuela's national income. This large deposit of oil makes the country the 
number one oil producer in South America and one of the most important producers and 
exporters in the world. The Gulf of Venezuela covers an area of over 17,000 square 
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kilometers and is the primary and most important of the Venezuelan gulfs. This is due not 
only to its extension but also because of its use for internal communications and resources 
it provides for the economy of the country. 
In the event of a potential military conflict arising in the Gulf of Venezuela, 
between Venezuela and Colombia, oil shipments to the United States would stop at the 
start of hostile action. This does not mean that the United States would necessarily 
support the Venezuelan position. Nevertheless, a conflict situation could seriously affect 
oil shipments to the United States. A conflict would also affect the sea lanes in the area, 
delaying or preventing many ships from transiting to the ports of Cartagena (Colombia) 
or Maracaibo (Venezuela). Such a conflict could even complicate the transit of shipping 
in the direction of the Panama Canal, thus creating an immediate and serious threat to 
U.S. security concerns. 
The problem of migratory flow from Colombia toward Venezuela does not 
represent a direct threat to the security of the United States. However, although the 
number of Colombian illegal immigrants in the United States is insignificant in 
comparison to the numbers of illegals coming from Mexico and Central America, it is 
important to point out that in the international arena, the United States is the country with 
the highest number of Colombian prisoners, followed closely by Venezuela. This 
situation, in general, has been produced by the activities of the narcotraffickers in North 
American territory and, also, although in a very minor manner, by the number of 
extraditions executed in accordance with the common agreement between Colombia and 
the United States. Once more, the geographical position of Venezuela and Colombia and 
their proximity to the United States are factors that should draw the attention of North 
American authorities. Colombia's current internal situation has not helped to deter the 
migratory flow of its indigenous population in search of socioeconomic improvement. The 
violence experienced through "narco-terrorism" in Colombia has also had a notable 
influence on the migratory flow. 
With respect to the impacts that the guerilla movements and the narcotraffickers 
could have on the security of the United States, it is necessary to note the important 
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relationship that exists between these two factors. This is the case of the Colombian 
Revolutionary Armed Forces (F ARC), who is the better trained insurgent group and is 
involved in drug trafficking. One can observe the problems posed by narcotrafficking and 
guerilla movements problem on democracy in Colombia. Despite a relatively long 
democratic tradition, the Colombian efforts to integrate the guerilla movements into the 
political system have had limited success. 
The defeat suffered by the Communist movement in the Cold War did not mean 
the disappearance of guerilla movements in Latin America. On the contrary, upon losing 
the ideology on which they drew their political power, many of these groups opted to ally 
themselves with the criminal organizations that control the narcotrafficking in order to 
obtain gigantic, but illegal, income. In Peru, it is evident that an alliance was made 
between the narcotraffickers and the Shining Path, in the Upper Huallaga Valley. 
In Colombia, the F ARC, the best-equipped insurgent group operating in the border 
region, initially collected taxes from drug traffickers and coca growers. Later, F ARC 
realized that drug trafficking was very profitable and, in 1984, entered the business of 
drug cultivation and smuggling. The F ARC (as well as the other guerrilla movements in 
Colombia, the ELN and the ELP) is a rebel movement that is disposed to negotiate with 
the Colombian government from a position of strength. Although they have lost their 
original Communist ideology, these rebellious groups have been convinced of the 
necessity to maintain their strength and capacity for negotiation. This was a result of 
several decades of armed conflict and finally coming to the conclusion that it was 
impossible to dominate all national territory from a political or military point of view. 
In reality the guerilla movements, like F ARC, represent some of the most serious 
anti-democratic forces in Latin America. The perseverance of these groups resides, in 
particular, in the fact that they try to defend their power base, even with violent military 
means. 
The problem of the narcotrafficking is of deep concern to the Colombian 
government because, together with the guerrilla movement, it is a serious threat against 
democratic stability. In Colombia, the internal consequences of instability produced by 
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these two factors are: problems in public health, irreparable damage to the environment, 
social disruption, corruption, political violence, and a dangerous environment of general 
unrest in the democratic system. 
Additionally, the discovery in Colombia of extensive plots of land under opium 
cultivation has also caused a high level of concern due to the evidence of a growing 
demand for consumption in the United States. Because of the extraordinary quantity of 
money involved and because of the power that it has to corrupt individuals and 
institutions (or at least the power of being able to threaten them in order to guarantee 
cooperation) the narcotrafficking has been recognized by the United States as one of the 
most dangerous threat to its security. 
In the United States, the trafficking of drugs is a self-inflicted crisis that generates 
more money than the inhabitants spend annually in gasoline. This situation has created a 
real dilemma for the United States government in that it has demonstrated the inability 
to modify (or to at least change) the behavior of its people in order to stop or diminish 
the growing demand that sustains the illicit drug trade. 
The narcotrafficking problem and its threat is international. The United States 
uses the policies of economic and military aid in order to demand the eradication of 
acreage cultivated in coca, marijuana, and poppy in Colombia as well as in other Andean 
countries such as Peru and Bolivia. Additionally, the United States provides Colombia 
and Venezuela radar systems to aid in the identification of flights and drug shipments 
towards North American territory. 
The sacrifice in human lives brought about by narcoterrorism and the ongoing 
fight against drugs in Colombia reveal a heavy toll in what is supposed to be a civilized 
nation in the western hemisphere. In response, the regions' producers, especially in 
Colombia, have demanded a greater demonstration and action, on the part of the U.S. 
government, to resolve its own problem of growing demand within its own borders. 
In the United States, the explosion in the consumption of crack and other drugs 
that generally are involved in crimes and homicides has affected society negatively. The 
social and economical costs for the United States are large. Looking only at 1989, 
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substance abuse in the U.S workforce cost the economy an estimated $200 billion in lost 
production, transportation accidents, and health care. The enormous economic earnings 
derived by the narcotrafficking also helped to develop larger criminal organizations in the 
Caribbean region and to extend its business nets by means of intimidation, corruption, and 
political influence. 
The U.S war against drugs, has failed in great part due to a lack of understanding 
of the complexity of the problem. The use of military force would not change the 
panorama because the narcotraffickers do not operate as identifiable armies, but on the 
contrary, all of their activities are hidden by corruption, generally in the form of payments 
in large quantities of money. Policies of interdicting drug shipments and military aid to 
drug producing countries have not been sufficient to resolve the problem. The policies 
and threats of extradition of narcotraffickers to North American territory have only served 
to generate more violence and to stir nationalistic passions. Lastly, crop substitution in 
producer countries could have long term results provided they are accompanied by social 
improvements in the standard of life of the peasant. However, the most difficult part of 
this problem resides in trying to control the demand for illegal drugs; one alternative 
which has been offered is the legalization of drugs in Colombia, as well as in the United 
States. 
The guerrilla movements' activities in alliance with narcotraffickers in Colombia, 
the migratory flow ofthe masses in search of socioeconomic improvements, and any other 
factor that can be characterized by a connection to the narcotrafficking (and its illegal 
activities) have a negative and direct affect on the security of Venezuela and on the 
United States. 
As discussed earlier, the effects of a possible armed conflict between Venezuela 
and Colombia, over a failure to reach a peaceful and equal agreement concerning the 
maritime dispute over the rights of the Gulf of Venezuela, would also have serious 
consequences for the security of the United States. However, one of the greatest 
strengths of both Venezuela and Colombia lies in the fact that they are democratically 
ruled. If well cultivated, this represents a strategic asset for the United States and a 
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potential source of long-term stability. What is important to point out here is the 
relationship between democracy and stability. There is ample evidence to show that 
democracies are the least violence-prone form of government. Democracies are systems 
that maximize and guarantee individual freedoms, promote pluralism and diversity, 
emphasize tolerance, and subscribe to the rule of law. Moreover, wars generally do not 
occur between democracies. 140 Where wars do not occur as a matter of course, because 
there are widespread institutionalized mechanisms for mediating and resolving disputes, 
there would seem to be little need for maintaining large, resource-consuming military 
establishments or for concentrating on defense to the virtual exclusion of development. 
However, where authoritarianism is the rule, there is a greater propensity for violence, as 
well as more fertile grounds for the emergence of the sorts of conditions or threats 
mentioned before. 
The cooperation of the United States, in promoting common security interests and 
democratic values, could have a very positive impact on regional stability and would deal 
better with U.S. security concerns in the Caribbean. 
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The prospects for conflict and cooperation between Venezuela and Colombia are 
affected by the nature of their relationship. Based on the theory of complex 
interdependency described by Keohane and Nye, this thesis has argued that Venezuela and 
Colombia are involved in an interdependent relationship. It is complex because of the 
many linkages between the two countries: economic (commercial, financial), diplomatic, 
human (illegal immigration), and security (cross-border insurgency, border disputes, drug 
trafficking, etc.). 
The theory of Keohane and Nye suggests that the greater the complexity in an 
interdependent relationship, the less likely either country will resort to force or self help 
to further its goals. In the case of Venezuela and Colombia, the interdependence has 
become more complex, as the two countries have drawn closer together through economic 
integration. That level of interdependence has placed new strains on the relationship. In 
other words, increased cooperation has heightened conflict, but in new areas, where 
dialogue and diplomacy have been used as instruments to manage that conflict. 
Although growing integration has made the utilization of force between the two 
countries less likely, both countries remain vulnerable and sensitive on numerous issues. 
The two countries are especially sensitive to the maritime dispute over the Gulf of 
Venezuela, and growing interdependence has not removed that issue from the bilateral 
agenda. 
The dynamics of interdependence between the two countries becomes extremely 
complicated and confusing when the governments of Venezuela and Colombia fail to 
establish an agenda that clearly identifies and prioritizes the hierarchy of the border 
security issues involving the maritime dispute over the Gulf of Venezuela, illegal 
immigration, cross-border insurgency, and drug-trafficking. Interdependence not only 
makes it possible but also makes it necessary to identify common objectives, prioritize 
them, and establish a common means to achieve them. Achieving these objectives 
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through mutual integration and through active participation in bilateral security operations 
will also increase the effectiveness of all policies requiring security cooperation. 
In order to achieve security cooperation it is also necessary to identify the 
elements that generate tension and distrust. Eliminating friction between the two countries 
and establishing a foundation of common security interests will permit bilateral 
implementation of mutually beneficial and effective border policies. Mutual trust and the 
results of effective border policies will lead to new levels of security, and defense 
cooperation between both Venezuela and Colombia. All of the stated factors are 
interrelated and cannot be addressed in isolation nor should they be weighed 
disproportionately. 
The economic integration programs initiated by Venezuela and Colombia are 
important steps in the search for harmony and cooperation in their bilateral relationship. 
The process of economic integration is virtually irreversible. In reality, the economies 
of the two countries are quite complementary and there are very few sectors of production 
in which unfair competitive advantages exist that could favor one of the two countries. 
The efforts of private entrepreneurs, from both Colombia and Venezuela, have made 
economic integration successful in a way that could be extended to third countries (i.e., 
Ecuador). However, the tension generated by conflict in the frontier region has greatly 
affected the level of Colombian-Venezuelan economic integration. The inability to 
resolve the security issues will diminish the potential for successful economic integration 
and reduce or impede the level of growth. 
There are some indicators that point to a desire by both nations to reach better 
prospects for future cooperation. Colombia's current president, Dr. Emesto Samper, in 
spite of having been one of the more radical proponents of Colombian rights in the 
maritime dispute over the Gulf of Venezuela, on several occasions after being elected has 
stated that the solution to this territorial conflict should be reached through friendly 
dialogue with Venezuela. Additionally, he has said that this dispute should not have any 
lingering negative effect on the process of economic integration. 
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From the domestic politics perspective, the stability of democratic systems in 
Venezuela and Colombia is also very important for the achievement of greater levels of 
cooperation and the continued development of mutual trust. The existence of democratic 
systems in both countries provides an environment that may resolve even territorial 
conflict through good will and bilateral negotiations. 
Furthermore the degree of trust between the armed forces of the two nations is not 
founded in the two military organizations themselves, but is based on the broad level of 
democracy in each country and the political relationship between Venezuela and 
Colombia. The use of military force is rendered ineffective in a complex interdependence 
such as the one defining the relationship between Venezuela and Colombia. In addition, 
it is important to point out that the armed forces of both countries are only tools to 
exercise the security policies of their respective governments. In sum, the degree of 
mutual trust, cooperation and effectiveness to implement border security policies in both 
nations will depend on political decisions. 
It is imperative for Venezuela and Colombia to establish an effective agenda in 
order to identify their mutual border security interests and to make effective bilateral 
decisions that will diminish the vulnerabilities of the two nations against the problems of 
illegal immigration, cross-border insurgency, and drug trafficking. These decisions should 
also help to diminish the sensitivities perceived to exist between the two countries and to 
initiate further confidence building measures. Consequently, these confidence-building 
measures will help diminish the tensions produced by incidents in the frontier region that 
continuously damage the harmony being built in the bilateral relationship. Resolving 
these issues and building mutual trust will accelerate the process of economic integration 
that undoubtedly is very important to the economies of both nations. 
The pursuit of a bilateral approach to resolve all the conflicts of border security 
issues existing in the complex interdependency between Venezuela and Colombia in no 
way compromises the sovereignty of both countries and can potentially work in favor of 
regional stability. Venezuela and Colombia have already established joint commissions 
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to ease the tensions caused by conflicts on the border and both nations have started to set 
up an agenda to resolve their differences. 
In summary, it seems likely that Venezuela and Colombia will continue to built 
the bases of their bilateral ties through economic integration. As the interdependent 
relationship becomes more complex, and as the two countries continue to strengthen their 
democracies, the prospects for ongoing cooperation are good. Nevertheless, conflicts will 
exist, but they can be managed through rational diplomatic channels and with tolerance 
and mutual respect. 
The ongoing complex interdependence in the relationship between Venezuela and 
Colombia and their implications for the U.S security in the Caribbean and the western 
hemisphere are clear. As integration becomes the rule throughout the Americas, and the 
spread of free trade and democracies are further consolidated, the prospects for peace and 
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